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Barrett: Elephant in the Boardroom?: Counting the Vote in Corporate Elect

ELEPHANT IN THE BOARDROOM?:
COUNTING THE VOTE IN CORPORATE
ELECTIONS
While corporate elections are not perfectly parallel to civic
elections . . . notions of what a fair election means and entails do inescapably
carry over . . . . It is troubling . . . if the side in control of the levers of power
employs them . . . to coerce its opposition . . . . One need not assume bad faith
on the part of incumbents to foresee . . . the prospects for unfairness; honest men
seeking their (disputable) vision of what is best, if not bound-in by rules, are
capable of gross impositions. Thus, it offers cold comfort that the law will
assume that directors are acting in good faith. Where the franchise is involved a
special obligation falls upon courts to review with care action that impinges
upon legitimate election activities.1
I. INTRODUCTION
After a tense proxy fight for control of Yahoo Inc., election results
announced at the August 1, 2008, annual meeting showed the incumbent
board of directors remained in control.2 Yahoo announced that
Chairman Roy Bostock received a 79.5% favorable vote, CEO Jerry Yang
85.4% favorable, and the next day the Wall Street Journal reported that
“[s]hareholders overwhelmingly endorsed the board.”3 The six-month
run-up to the annual meeting had been tumultuous: it began with an
unsolicited buyout offer from Microsoft on February 1, followed by onagain, off-again negotiations with Microsoft, the unwelcome intervention
of Carl Icahn, a “just vote no” proxy campaign mounted by dissident
shareholders, and a share price that had roller-coastered from about $20
to more than $33 and back to $20.4
The Yahoo board’s sense of relief was short-lived because an
institutional investor asked Broadridge Financial Solutions, the

1
Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., Civ. A. No. 11510, 1990 WL 114222 at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9,
1990) (holding, despite the dicta quoted, that under Unocal analysis a board’s defenses
against a takeover bid were reasonable in light of the threat). Chancellor Allen stated
further that “assessment of the reasonably foreseeable consequences . . . on legitimate
election activities, made as of the time that the board acted . . . is relevant for a
determination whether the action was authorized and whether it constituted a breach of
duty of loyalty.” Id. at *6.
2
Jessica E. Vascellaro, Yahoo Shareholders Endorse Board, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2008, at B6,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121761996994605499.html.
3
Id.
4
See Jessica E. Vascellaro & Matthew Karnitschnig, Yahoo Will Add Icahn to its Board,
WALL ST. J., July 22, 2008, at B2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB121664028755469981.html (including a table that concisely summarizes the key events
leading up to Yahoo’s annual meeting. Id.
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independent vote-tabulator Yahoo had employed, to check the totals.5
The investor, who along with a related fund, controlled about 16% of
Yahoo’s outstanding stock, strongly doubted whether support for the
incumbent board was as high as news reports indicated.6 After checking
the totals, Broadridge and Yahoo announced a corrected vote count on
August 5, revealing a miscount amounting to about 20% of the total vote,
with roughly twice as many votes withheld from the chairman and CEO
as first reported.7 The recount did not change the outcome of the
election, but shareholders’ view of the board’s performance evidently fell
short of overwhelming endorsement.8
The events at Yahoo were not unique.9 For two and one-half months
after the June 2008 annual meeting of CSX Corp., the incumbent board

Jessica E. Vascellaro, Yahoo Shareholder Questions Vote on CEO, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5,
2008, at B6, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121788630096211373.html.
6
Id.
7
Benjamin Pimentel & Dan Gallagher, Yahoo Board Vote Count Sharply Revised,
MARKETWATCH, Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/votes-againstyahoo-board-much/story.aspx?guid={91D5D9F5-AC7B-4F60-9B08-69FF5A156875}&dist=
msr_6; Jessica E. Vascellaro, Yahoo Vote-Counting Error Overstated Support for Yang, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 6, 2008, at B6. Analysis revealed the source of the error was a truncated total on a
computer-generated report. Scott M. Fulton III, Huge Correction: More Opposition to Yahoo’s
Yang than First Tabulated, BETA NEWS (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.betanews.com/article/
Huge_correction_More_opposition_to_Yahoos_Yang_than_first_tabulated/1218038502
(candidates who received votes totaling a nine-digit number “had votes removed from
their ‘against’ column and moved to their ‘for’ column. . . . Shareholder votes were
tabulated on paper”).
8
Pimentel & Gallagher, supra note 7.
9
See In re Waddell & Reed Financial, Inc., No. Civ. A. 4602-CC (Del. Ch., June 12, 2009)
(ordering an inspector of election to reopen the vote and accept previously omitted votes of
approximately 3.2 million shares of Waddell & Reed after a proxy advisory firm failed to
transmit votes because of a technical error). See generally Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R.
Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 IOWA L. REV. 485, 510–11
(1994):
The leaky dam of proxy tabulation burst in the 1993 proxy season
when various institutional investors blew the whistle on Automatic
Data Processing (ADP) [now Broadridge], a tabulation firm that
handles over seventy percent of all corporate proxy solicitations.
Several investors claimed [Broadridge] had not tallied their proxies in
a “just vote no” campaign against Paramount Communications. The
Paramount miscount was only the tip of the iceberg. During the
solicitation period before the 1993 spring annual meetings,
[Broadridge] had experienced significant difficulties: Proxy materials
were sent out late or not at all; [Broadridge] received proxy tabulations
late or not at all, causing several firms to struggle to meet quorum
requirements or to postpone meetings; electronic tabulation systems
failed to function; and proxy solicitors had to solicit proxies several
times.
Id.
5
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battled two hedge funds, which together controlled about 20% of CSX’s
voting shares, before a court decision placed four insurgent director
candidates on CSX’s board.10 In the April 2008 election at Washington
Mutual (“WaMu”), votes cast by brokers, rather than owners,
determined the incumbent board’s re-election.11 In the 2005 merger of
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. with Shire Pharmaceuticals Group PLC,
some Transkaryotic shareholders, alleging inaccurate tabulation of votes,
disputed whether the merger had been validly approved.12
The dirty secret is that when shareholders vote in a corporate
election, nothing assures an accurate vote count—as one investment
manager observed, “nobody is really penalized if they don’t do their
job.”13 The problem is this: corporate elections are supposed to
10
Alex Roth, Vote ‘08: CSX vs. Activists, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2008, at C3; Alex Roth, In
CSX Proxy, Funds Claim Victory in Close Board Vote, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2008, at C1; Heidi
N. Moore, CSX, TCI Count Evokes a Classic, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2008, at C3; CSX Announces
Final Voting Results for 2008 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, company news release (July 31,
2008), available at http://investors.csx.com/ (follow “News Releases,” then “2008”
hyperlinks); David Glovin, CSX Loses Appeal to Block TCI From Winning Two Seats (Update2),
Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aLBL61SRPxe
0&dbk; CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y.
2008), aff’d 292 F. App’x 133 (2d Cir. 2008) (litigating whether irregularities in proxy
disclosures and the differences between shares and equity swaps should disqualify the
hedge funds’ proxies). Less than a year later, the hedge funds had sold their CSX shares,
which had lost about fifty percent of their value, and relinquished their board positions.
Alex Roth & Cassell Bryan-Low, Fund Sells CSX Shares in Wake of Proxy Fight, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 29, 2009, at A24.
11
Jeff Nash, Broker Vote Zaps Shareholder Might, FINANCIAL WEEK (Apr. 28, 2008),
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080428/REG/694771377.
Financial Week reported “[n]one of WaMu’s 13 directors received a majority of no votes,
although shareholders withheld 40% or more of all votes from two of them . . . .” and
“broker votes [had] counted for more than 19% of the votes cast in WaMu’s 2007 director
election.” Id. The article noted that brokers usually vote for incumbent management and
“these ‘phantom’ votes can provide management with a handicap of up to 20% in
elections.” Id. Official vote totals allow an inference that the broker vote may have been
one-fourth of the total vote. See Washington Mutual, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at
94 (Aug. 11, 2008). See also Shamrock Holdings of Cal., Inc. v. Iger, 2005 WL 5756479 at *1,
n.7 (Del.Ch. June 6, 2005) (revealing that Disney’s CEO Michael Eisner would not have
been elected without “for” votes from brokers—counting broker votes, 45.4% were
withheld, but 54.4% of shareholder-instructed shares were withheld from Eisner); infra note
100 (in uncontested director elections, brokers may vote their customers’ shares if
shareholders do not provide voting instructions).
12
In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 355 (Del. Ch. 2008). Although the
inspector of election certified that Transkaryotic shareholders had approved the merger by
a margin of 2.6%, evidence showed genuine issues of material fact as to irregularities in
validating and counting certain proxies, involving more votes than the margin by which
the merger was approved. Id. at 375–76, 378.
13
Brandes Institute, Proxy Voting: Making Sure the Vote Counts, October 2003,
http://www.brandes.com/Institute/Documents/Proxy%20Voting%20092903.pdf, at 5.
See also Meagan Thompson-Mann, Voting Integrity: Practices for Investors and the Proxy
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legitimate directors’ power—and, by extension, the way our economic
system works—but real legitimacy depends on a voting process that is
fair and accurate.14
This Note focuses on the curious absence of accountability for
accurately counting votes in corporate elections; it assumes—quite apart
from the spirited debate concerning the proper role of shareholder
voting in corporate governance—that any time an election is called,
voters are entitled to nothing less than an accurate count of legitimately
cast votes. Throughout, unless otherwise specified, the term “election”
refers to any process in which shareholders vote—equally to the election
of directors and to voting on a merger or charter amendment. Delaware
corporation law, the most thoroughly developed body of law on rights of
shareholders and the body of law applicable to more corporations than
any other, provides the legal framework.15
Part II first reviews the Delaware corporation law germane to the
discussion of counting the vote in corporate elections.16 Second, it
examines the increasing incidence of contested and close corporate
elections, which has exposed weaknesses in the mechanisms and
governing law for counting the vote.17 Third, it reviews fiduciary duties
under Delaware corporate law, which frame any question of
accountability for conducting the voting process fairly.18 Fourth, it
discusses how the modern practice of holding shares “in street name”
complicates the mechanics of conducting a corporate election.19 Fifth, it

Industry 11 (Yale School of Management, Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and
Performance, Policy Briefing No. 2, working draft, June 2008), available at
http://millstein.som.yale.edu/2008%2006%2005%20voting%20integrity2.pdf (noting that
consequences of miscast or lost votes to shareholders and intermediaries can be financial or
reputational, including loss of clients).
14
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power
rests.”). An alternative view is that nowadays “voting by shareholders is best explained as
error correction of managers rather than as an inherent shareholder right to participate.”
Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 141 (2009).
But accepting this alternative view arguendo, surely a vote could be efficacious to correct
managers’ errors only if it is counted accurately.
15
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine Jr., Function over Form: A Reassessment
of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1288 (2001)
(Delaware’s law of business organization is of paramount importance in establishing U.S.
pre-eminence in facilitating economic welfare).
16
See infra Part II.A.
17
See infra Part II.B.
18
See infra Part II.C.
19
See infra Part II.D–E.
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briefly examines two possible ways to work around or reduce the
complexity with technology.20
Part III analyzes, first, the legal and economic reasons why both
directors’ and shareholders’ governance powers deserve protection, and
second, the inevitability of errors in the complex proxy-handling system
that has evolved around existing legal presumptions and institutional
economic interests.21 Third, it evaluates how much technology could
alleviate errors and identifies obstacles to implementing technical
solutions.22 Fourth, it examines biases inherent in current proxyhandling procedures and legal rules.23 Part IV proposes a doctrine,
consistent with established Delaware precedents, to strengthen fiduciary
accountability for an accurate vote count in the corporate election
process.24
II. BACKGROUND
The expectation that votes legitimately cast in an election should be
counted accurately is intrinsic to fundamental notions of democracy:
“the elector’s right . . . is not only that to cast his ballot but that to have it
honestly counted.”25
This Part presents background information concerning the legal
context of corporate elections. It begins with a summary of relevant
Delaware statutes and case law, followed by an examination of reasons
why contested corporate elections occur more frequently than in years
past. Third, it catalogues the standards of review for corporate directors’
fiduciary duties (where any accountability for more accurate elections

See infra Part II.F.
See infra Part III.A–B.
22
See infra Part III.C.
23
See infra Part III.D.
24
See infra Part IV.
25
United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 388 (1944) (reversing lower court’s ruling that
stuffing a ballot-box in an election for a U.S. senator was not a criminal offense under
federal law). Despite disagreement whether regulation of elections is a question of federal
or state jurisdiction, justices agreed there is a close association between the right to cast
votes and the expectation of fair and honest counting of votes cast. See Frank J. Obara, Jr.,
The Counting and Reporting of the Vote, Including the Role of Inspectors of Elections, 10-3 in R.
FRANKLIN BALOTTI, JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN & GREGORY P. WILLIAMS, MEETINGS OF
STOCKHOLDERS (1995 & Supp. 2008) (commenting that in a fair and honest corporate
election someone should attest to accuracy of the tabulation). See also John H. Biggs,
Shareholder Democracy: The Roots of Activism and the Selection of Directors, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
493, 501 (2008) (“The self-appointing character of how directors of public companies are
elected has long been an awkward matter for boards to explain, in light of the perceived
democratic process that shareholder ownership suggests. The single slate of directors to
‘choose’ from doesn’t square with American ideas of democracy.”).
20
21
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must lie). Fourth, it summarizes the practical realities of owning and
trading shares in corporations, which is different today than it was when
Delaware’s corporation law established key presumptions. Fifth, it
summarizes the procedures by which a corporation conducts an election
and the attendant opportunities for errors. And sixth, it touches on
technologies that could simplify the process and reduce errors.
A. Corporate Elections under Delaware’s General Corporation Law
Delaware law affirms that directors hold the power to manage a
Delaware corporation’s business, counterbalanced by shareholders’
power to elect the directors and to vote on the approval of fundamental
proposals.26 Although, in theory, shareholders can nominate and elect
directors and amend bylaws without prior board approval, as a practical
matter they can only ratify or veto the board’s proposals.27 Theory and
reality are often at odds; as one scholar has noted, “[c]ourts often
commence their opinions with the stern but tired maxims of fiduciary
duties . . . only to subsequently invoke the purifying balm of the
‘business judgment rule’ . . . to preclude inquiry into the merits of
directors’ decisions.”28
26
DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 141(a) (2009) (“The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors.”); § 211(b) (2009) (annual meeting and election of directors); § 242 (2009)
(amending the articles of incorporation); § 251(c) (2009) (shareholder approval of mergers);
§ 271(a) (2009) (sale of substantially all corporate assets); § 275 (2009) (dissolution of
corporation). But cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise 155 (Harvard
Law School Discussion Paper No. 567, March 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=952078 (arguing that “[s]hareholders commonly do not have a viable power to
replace the directors of public companies”); ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., & GARDINER C. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 139 (1932) (describing the proxy
machinery as not providing shareholders power over management but rather as separating
power from shareholders). In Speiser v. Baker, Chancellor Allen reviewed the history of the
prohibition on directors voting corporately-held shares of stock, which dates from early
nineteenth-century decisions. 525 A.2d 1001, 1009–10 (Del. Ch. 1987). At all times since,
courts have been concerned that directors should not control the means of perpetuating
their power, and later corporation law statutes uniformly embodied the prohibition. Id.
27
DEL. CODE tit. 8 §§ 109(a), 211(b), 251(b)–(c), 271(a) (2009). Compare Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 601, 616–17
(2006) (“[O]nly the election of directors and amending the bylaws do not require board
approval before shareholder action is possible. In practice . . . even the election of
directors . . . is predetermined by the existing board nominating the next year’s board.”),
with Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 660 (2007)
(finding it “deeply unsettling” that corporate elections allow shareholders only to vote for
the candidate or abstain but not to vote against a candidate, and proposing that the SEC
should amend proxy rules to allow “against” votes).
28
Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and
Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (1983). Compare In
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By statute, strict rules apply to corporate elections. Delaware
corporations must call shareholder meetings annually, and may call
special meetings according to circumstances that require a vote.29 The
board must comply with statutory requirements in setting the record
date, on which the list of shareholders eligible to vote is determined, and
must make the list available to registered shareholders.30 In addition, the
board must disclose information that is material to questions on which
shareholders will vote.31 Registered record owners have the sole right to
re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 360–61 and n.48 (Del. Ch. 2008) (discussing
Delaware courts’ consistent position that a breach of the board’s duty of disclosure
surrounding matters on which shareholders vote leads to irreparable harm that justifies
injunctive relief), and In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S’holders Litig., 906 A.2d 766, 772 (Del.
2006) (recognizing the stockholder’s right to cast an informed vote), and In re Topps Co.
S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 94–95 (Del. Ch. 2007) (enjoining a merger vote where a
standstill agreement with a competing bidder effectively withheld from shareholders
material information concerning a proposed merger), and Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
811 (Del. 1984) (if stockholders are displeased they have the power replace the board), and
Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (referring to a “rule that demands of a corporate
officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his
duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his
charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the
corporation”), with San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 2009
WL 1337150 at *10 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2009) (upholding board’s power to enter into contracts
that trigger a “poison put” debt acceleration if shareholders vote to replace directors, and
exonerating the board from a duty of care to be informed of contractual commitments that
conflict with the board’s fiduciary duties), and McPadden v. Sidhu, No. Civ. A. 3310-CC
(Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 2008) (where directors countenanced egregious self-dealing by an officer
in the spin-off of a subsidiary, the court found exculpable gross negligence rather than a
breach of good faith or loyalty), and In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2008 WL
959992 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008) (staying action in Delaware court with effect to allow
issuance of new stock to acquirer to determine outcome of merger vote), and Moore Corp.
Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1564 (D. Del. 1995) (directors had
right to refuse to redeem the poison pill even though shareholders had tendered 73.4% of
shares), and Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (approving
Time board’s merger decision that gave shareholders a lower price than a competing offer
and was structured to deny shareholders a vote, because of the threat that shareholders
might perceive their interest differently than the board did). In The Control and Conflict of
Interest Voting Systems, Lynne L. Dallas argues that voting may co-opt shareholders,
amounting to illusory participation that provides the mere appearance of accountability.
71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 33–35 (1992).
29
DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 211(b)–(d) (2009) (specifying requirements for meetings of
shareholders; annual meetings; special meetings).
30
Id. § 213 (2009) (fixing date for determination of stockholders of record); § 219 (2009)
(list of stockholders entitled to vote; penalty for refusal to produce; stock ledger).
31
SEC Rule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13 (2007); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del.
1998) (when communicating about corporate matters, “the sine qua non of directors’
fiduciary duty to shareholders is honesty”); Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1056 (Del.
1996) (directors’ duty to disclose includes avoiding partial disclosures that may mislead);
Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (when it seeks shareholder action, a board has a
fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 5

132

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

cast votes, although beneficial owners have the right to direct voting of
their shares.32
At a meeting of shareholders, the inspector of election has statutory
duties: to determine the number of shares eligible to vote and present at
the meeting, either in person or by proxy; to receive proxies and ballots
and to determine their validity (including hearing and resolving
challenges); to count votes; and to provide a report certifying the vote
totals as well as any challenges to voting rights.33 If the inspector of
election cannot resolve a dispute as to the validity of proxies, the parties
have recourse in the Chancery Court, which can order and supervise a
new election or grant other equitable relief as appropriate.34
The board of directors exercises significant control over the voting
process.35 It nominates director candidates and sets the record date and
meeting date; it has the exclusive right to formulate most proposals on
which shareholders can vote; it appoints the proxy solicitors, tabulator,
and inspector of election; and it controls the agenda and chairs the
meeting.36 Unlike a competing faction, if any, the board can spend
32
DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 219(c) (2009); SEC Rule 14A-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (2007). See
Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 494 (Del. 1989) (“from the perspective of the
Delaware corporation, a broker who is the stockholder of record, has the legal authority to
vote in person or by proxy on all matters. Nevertheless, the relationship between a broker,
who is the ‘record owner,’ and the beneficial owner is governed by the rules of the various
stock exchanges.”); Enstar v. Senouf, 535 A.2d 1351, 1356 (Del. 1987) (a Delaware
corporation need not look beyond the registered owners). Commonly, the actual
“beneficial” owner of shares is not the “record” owner shown on a corporation’s stock
register; allowing a broker or bank to be the record owner facilitates trading and overall
efficiency of stock markets. See infra Part II.D. Except on discretionary matters as defined
by stock exchange rules, brokers are bound to vote according to beneficial owners’ voting
instructions. Berlin, 552 A.2d at 493–94 and nn.14–15 (citing stock exchange rules); Bay
Nfld. Co., Ltd., v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 37 A.2d 59, 63 (Del. 1944) (registered holder would
not be recognized in equity as entitled to vote shares against true owner’s wishes); Hauth
v. Giant Portland Cement Co., 96 A.2d 233, 235 (Del.Ch. 1953) (proxyholder has fiduciary
obligation to carry out owner’s wishes); In re Canal Const. Co., 182 A. 545, 548 (Del. Ch.
1936) (estate administrator who transferred shares but was still registered holder on record
date may not exercise the voting right in defiance of the transferee’s wishes).
33
DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 231(b) (2009). See also Obara, supra note 25, at 10-6.
34
DEL. CODE tit. 8 §§ 225, 227 (2009); Berlin, 552 A.2d at 491 (inspectors’ determinations
are presumed correct under law, but may be challenged in a suit).
35
In re MONY Group S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 675 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“[I]n the context
of a stockholder vote a board of directors must perform a myriad of ministerial functions in
order to ensure an orderly voting process which all, in some way, indirectly affect the
vote.”). See also Dallas, supra note 28, at 19–20.
36
DEL. CODE tit. 8 §§ 211(a), (d), 213, 231, 251(b)–(c), 271(a)–(b) (2009). See, e.g., Portnoy
v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 2008) (setting aside a corporate election and
holding that an incumbent board’s secret vote-buying arrangement and manipulative
conduct of annual meeting were inequitable conduct); State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys.
Corp., No. Civ. A. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376 at *12 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (declining
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corporate funds to promote its candidates and proposals, and as the final
vote count approaches, the board is better informed than any competing
faction about how the vote is accumulating.37
Delaware courts declare that boards have a duty of scrupulous
fairness in conducting elections.38 Any time incumbent board members’
actions may be seen to promote board entrenchment, their good faith
may be scrutinized.39
In Solomon v. Alexander, the court asked
summary judgment against a board although it found none of the board’s “plethora” of
justifications adequate for adjourning the meeting in order to selectively solicit additional
proxies).
37
Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F.Supp. 797, 803–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (in a
contest over policy, a board may make reasonable corporate expenditures to persuade
shareholders). See infra text accompanying note 119; In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926
A.2d 58, 68 (Del. Ch. 2007) (documenting how the Topps CEO and chairman, facing defeat
in a contested 2006 election of directors, postponed the annual meeting long enough to
negotiate a deal with insurgents to enlarge the board—and save his directorship). See also
Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, forthcoming in 10 AMER. L. & ECON.
REV., available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=980695# at 29–30
(“The status quo allows management to obtain frequent vote updates, while shareholder
opponents of management often have no comparable knowledge. . . . [I]f management sees
that it is well behind, it can undertake an extraordinary effort, while its opponents have no
obvious way of responding.”).
In Portnoy, the Chancery Court found a board’s exploitation of such advantage
inequitable; since that decision, a new innovation, designed to assure that management will
prevail, has appeared in proxy solicitations. 940 A.2d at 47. An example is found in the
voting instruction form distributed on behalf of Foundry Networks, Inc. for its special
meeting to be held on Dec. 17, 2008: the board asked shareholders to approve Proposal 2—
“To approve the adjournment of the special meeting to permit further solicitation of
proxies if there are not sufficient votes at the special meeting to approve the first proposal
[a Plan of Merger] described above”—that is, management solicited an exculpating
ratification, in advance, of conduct the courts have found improper. Foundry Networks,
Inc. Special Meeting to be Held on 12/17/08 at 10:00 a.m. PST for Holders as of 11/07/08
(voting instruction form distributed by or on behalf of UBS Financial Services, Inc. to
beneficial owners) (on file with author).
38
Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987). The court was emphatic:
The corporate election process, if it is to have any validity, must be
conducted with scrupulous fairness and without any advantage being
conferred or denied to any candidate or slate of candidates . . . those in
charge of the election machinery of a corporation must be held to the
highest standards in providing for and conducting corporate elections.
Id. at 1206–07; see also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (stating that directors’
fiduciary duties of due care, good faith, and loyalty are unremitting and include duty to
deal with shareholders honestly).
39
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (holding the board
acted inequitably, with purpose to perpetuate itself in office, when it advanced the annual
meeting date and thereby denied a dissident faction time to mount its proxy battle); accord
Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 914 (Del. Ch. 1980) (invalidating board
action when, faced with a known dissident, the board had called an annual meeting with
only sixty-three days advance notice after passing a bylaw requiring alternative director
candidates be nominated seventy days in advance of the annual meeting); Giuricich v.
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rhetorically, “how should a court . . . conceive of the best way to protect
shareholders’ valid expectation that they will be dealt with fairly?” and
answered, “a fully-informed, non-coerced vote.”40 Courts have found
wrongful coercion where someone’s actions cause shareholders to vote
for a reason other than the merits of the transaction.41 A board’s duty is
not only to abstain from overtly and intentionally manipulating
corporate elections, but also to be affirmatively fair to dissidents; a board
may not passively take advantage of a bylaw that prevents dissident
shareholders from conducting a timely proxy contest.42 However,
Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982) (willful perpetuation of a shareholder deadlock,
resulting in board’s entrenchment, frustrated a 50% shareholder’s voting rights and
justified court’s appointment of a custodian). On entrenchment in takeover battles, see
infra Part II.C.4.
40
Solomon v. Alexander, 747 A.2d 1098, 1127 (Del. Ch. 1999). The case involved a
shareholder challenge to the division of assets and disentanglement of information
technology operations when General Motors split off its Electronic Data Systems (EDS)
subsidiary to holders of a “tracking stock” based on EDS’s operating performance. Id. at
1106–09. Although plaintiffs’ allegations might have rebutted the presumption of
protection by the business judgment rule, the court found that an uncoerced vote of
shareholders preserved the protection. Id. at 1111.
41
Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1382–83 (Del. 1996) (vote by a majority of
shareholders validly ratified a board-passed recapitalization involving an amendment to
the certificate of incorporation that diminished the voting power of shares for three years
after their sale to a new shareholder). A court may nullify an election if it finds coercion in
proxy disclosures or in the terms of a proposed transaction or in surrounding
circumstances. Id. at 1382.
42
See Moran v. Household Intern., Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1080 (Del. Ch. 1985) (subversion
of corporate democracy by manipulation of corporate machinery will not be countenanced
under Delaware law). But cf. Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enters., No. Civ. A.
11779, 1991 WL 3151 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991). In Hubbard, the board had enforced an
advance-notice bylaw even though circumstances changed materially after the advancenotice deadline had passed, to the disadvantage of dissidents who wished to nominate
alternative candidates. Id. at *2. The court required the board to waive the bylaw and
allow dissident shareholders to nominate a slate of director candidates, reasoning that
“occasions do arise where board inaction, even where not inequitable in purpose or design,
may nonetheless operate inequitably.” Id. at *10. In Blasius, Chancellor Allen noted that
“an unintended breach of the duty of loyalty is unusual but not novel.” 564 A.2d at 663
(citing Lerman and AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103
(Del.Ch. 1986)). In Linton v. Everett, Vice Chancellor Jacobs set aside election results, noting
“it is not required that scienter, i.e., actual subjective intent to impede the voting process, be
shown.” No. Civ. A. 15219, 1997 WL 441189, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997); accord Accipiter
Life Sciences Fund, L.P. v. Helfer, 905 A.2d 115, 127 (Del. Ch. 2006) (holding that the court’s
“equitable powers can only be roused under Schnell where compelling circumstances . . .
constitute an evident or grave incursion into the fabric of the corporate law”). Cf. In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 757 (Del. Ch. 2005) (discussing the possibility of
breaching fiduciary duty through inaction). But in In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.,
Chancellor Chandler stated that “a vote tabulation claim that fails to allege any
wrongdoing . . . on the part of the individual defendants can only be asserted against the
Company” and that a plaintiff asking a court to invalidate an election must present clear
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despite frequent references in dicta to a board’s fiduciary duties, the
courts seldom, even in cases of wrongdoing, apply a remedy other than
merely setting aside an unfair election and ordering a new one.43
B. Contested Elections
For many years, shareholders’ role in public companies was mostly
passive.44 But recently, activist investors, including pension plans and
hedge funds, as well as so-called raiders like Carl Icahn, have contested
director elections, compensation proposals, charter and bylaw
amendments, merger and takeover transactions, and precatory

and convincing evidence that the election was in fact invalid. 954 A.2d 346, 374 nn.124–25
(Del. Ch. 2008).
43
See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 36–42. But cf. Rice & Hutchins, Inc. v. Triplex Shoe Co.,
147 A. 317, 324 (Del. Ch. 1929) (reversing outcome of contested election of directors by
court order). In striking contrast, tampering with union elections can result in criminal
racketeering charges. In United States v. DeFries, union officials were charged with
fraudulently procuring their election as well as approval by members of a merger with
another union that triggered generous severance payments to the officials, who
immediately assumed the same responsibilities for the successor merged union. 858 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1994), order rev’d on other grounds, 43 F.3d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and on
remand, 909 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 129 F.3d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
The trial court noted that:
[18 U.S.C.] § 1346 has expressly declared “honest services” to be an
interest protected by the mail fraud statute, and it appears to the Court
that the “honest services” any organization is entitled to expect of its
officers includes, at a minimum, that the officers. . . refrain from
corrupting the organization’s election proceedings . . . .
858 F. Supp at 4. In reinstating mail fraud counts of the indictment, the appeal court stated
that the improperly handled ballots were property covered by the mail fraud statute and
that
even if it were actually proven at trial that the defendants tampered
with fewer ballots than necessary to turn the election, the theft would
nevertheless undermine the election’s credibility—and thus the value
of the union’s entire investment in the process—if accompanied by
evidence of a risk of broader wrongdoing.
43 F.3d at 710. A jury convicted the defendants of mail fraud and racketeering, 909 F.
Supp. at 15, but procedural error and faulty jury instructions caused reversal on appeal.
129 F.3d at 1302, 1305, 1310, 1312.
44
Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 (Del. Ch. 1985) (“[i]t has, for a long time, been conventional to
dismiss the stockholder vote as a vestige or ritual of little practical importance. It may be
that we are now witnessing the emergence of new institutional voices and arrangements
that will make the stockholder vote a less predictable affair than it has been.”). See also
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders 4–5, UCLA School of
Law, Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-02, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1089606.
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resolutions.45 As a result, today shareholders’ votes make a difference
more than ever before.46
In response to hostile corporate takeover battles that emerged during
the 1980s, corporations adopted a variety of defenses, such as the
stockholder rights plan, commonly known as the poison pill.47 After
Delaware courts legitimated the poison pill, it became a favored
mechanism for boards to fend off unsolicited takeover bids.48 A board

NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.01 Shareholder
Approval, available at http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.
nyse.com/regulation/listed/1182508124422.html&displayPage=/lcm/lcm_section.html.
The NYSE manual notes: “Shareholders’ interest and participation in corporate affairs has
greatly increased. Management has responded by providing more extensive and frequent
reports on matters of interest to investors. In addition, an increasing number of important
corporate decisions are being referred to shareholders for their approval.” See State of Wis.
Inv. Bd., No. Civ. A. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376, at *19 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (“[s]ince the
Blasius opinion was issued over a decade ago, several large institutional stockholders,
including SWIB, have become increasingly proactive in challenging management proposals
by asserting their rights as stockholders.”); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging
Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1229 (2008) (citing three mergers in recent years
that were approved by slim margins: Compaq and Hewlett-Packard with 51.4% approval,
AXA and MONY with 53.8% approval, and Transkaryotic Therapies with 52% approval);
Listokin, supra note 37, at 14 (identifying over 16,000 resolutions presented for shareholder
approval during the period from 1997 to 2004). See also Biggs, supra note 25 (arguing that
shareholder activism results in large measure from the shift from defined-benefit to
defined-contribution retirement plans prompted by the 1976 enactment of ERISA and
resultant democratization of interest in corporate governance).
46
Soc’y of Corp. Sec’ys & Governance Prof’ls, Comment Letter to the SEC Re:
Roundtables Regarding Stockholder Rights and the Federal Proxy Rules, Proxy Voting
Issues: Voting Integrity, Mar. 26, 2007, at 2, http://www.governanceprofessionals.org/
commentletters/flash20s.shtml (“[w]ith closer elections and increasing shareholder
activism, it is important that votes are counted accurately and fairly represent the longterm interests of all stockholders.”).
47
Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STANFORD L. REV. 887,
904 (2002).
Poison pills consist of stock warrants or rights that allow the holder to
buy an acquirer’s stock (a so-called “flip over” provision), the target’s
stock (a “flip in” provision), or both at a substantial discount from the
market price. These rights only become exercisable in the event that a
shareholder (the “acquiring person”) buys more than a certain
percentage of the target’s stock (typically 10 or 15%) without the target
board’s approval. These rights are explicitly not exercisable by the
acquiring person, so the resulting dilution in his voting power and
economic stake may make the acquisition of the target through market
purchases too expensive to pursue.
Id. (emphasis added).
48
Moran, 500 A.2d 1346, 1352 (holding that a “poison pill” defense is legal under
Delaware law). See Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1229 (“In takeover contests, Delaware
law, by upholding the poison pill, has channeled the decision into the annual meeting. The
45
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equipped with a poison pill could force the bidder to negotiate with the
board rather than offer to purchase shares from shareholders.49 The only
way for a bidder to overcome a poison pill is to oust the board, replacing
it with a new board that will remove the pill; so, with the widespread
adoption of poison pills, takeover bids were channeled into proxy
contests for control of corporate boards.50
C. Fiduciary Duties—Standards of Review
A keystone of corporate law is the separation of ownership and
control of the modern corporation:
managers manage,51 but
shareholders have rights to elect directors, to approve “fundamental”
changes (usually only proposals made by the board of directors), and to
sell their shares.52 Deriving from the history of the corporate form,
fiduciary rules of agency law underlie the relationship between owners
(shareholders) and managers (directors and officers) of a corporation.53
prevailing mode of hostile acquisitions has become a bid coupled with a proxy contest so
as to replace the directors and remove the poison pill.”).
49
R. Franklin Balotti & J. Travis Laster, Professor Coates is Right. Now Please Study
Stockholder Voting. 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 819 (2000).
50
See Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1313 (“Replacing the board became an essential part
of a hostile offeror’s strategy, because that was the only way to circumvent the otherwise
preclusive effect of the poison pill”). But cf. Velasco, supra note 27, at 675 (arguing that
takeover bids are not about managing the business—directors’ domain—but about
shareholder’s rights to sell their shares, a decision in which directors should not intrude).
51
DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 141(a) (2009). The code states the principle:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its
certificate of incorporation. If any such provision is made in the
certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or
imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised
or performed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be
provided in the certificate of incorporation.
Id.
52
See supra notes 26–27 (listing statutes that set out shareholders’ rights relating to
fundamental changes).
53
Dallas, supra note 28, at 5–12 (outlining the history of corporate law as it pertains to
voting rights, from origins in partnership and contract to the entity theory to modern
concepts involving the interaction of multiple constituencies). Dallas concludes the
historical discussion with the observation that management is no longer an agent of
shareholders. Id. at 11. Bainbridge describes the function of shareholder voting rights as a
means of holding empowered directors accountable to tacit bargains, or at least to
standards of reasonable performance, but also as “an accountability device of last resort to
be used sparingly . . . .” Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 627. However, in Bainbridge’s view
the board operates “within a pervasive web of accountability mechanisms that substitute
for monitoring” by shareholders and shareholder voting is therefore all but superfluous.
Id. at 625.
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Even though many decisions have narrowed the duties that directors
owe to shareholders, Delaware courts maintain that directors of a
corporation are in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its
shareholders, and that the fiduciary relation is relevant to the conduct of
corporate elections.54
Delaware decisions of the 1985–1995 takeover era shaped modern
corporate law regarding the rights and duties of shareholders and
directors.55 Ex-Chancellor Allen, writing in 2001 with Vice Chancellors
Jacobs and Strine, recounted the story of how:
54
Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938). The Chancery Court reaffirmed this
principle in Solomon:
The nature and effect of the fiduciary relationship between directors
and shareholders is the very bedrock of Delaware’s corporate
jurisprudence. A basic duty of fairness, i.e., the requirement to treat
shareholders and their equity interest in the corporation fairly, is the
broadest notion of the duties directors owe to the corporation’s
shareholders.
747 A.2d at 1111. But cf. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del.2000) (“Aspirational ideals
of good corporate governance practices . . . are highly desirable, [and] often tend to benefit
stockholders . . . . But they are not required by the corporation law and do not define
standards of liability.”). A number of academic commentators argue that modern practice
has, in effect, superseded the courts’ stated adherence to fiduciary duties. See Douglas G.
Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money (Fiduciary Duty to Shareholders), 60
STANFORD L. REV. 1309, 1317–20 (2008) (noting common board actions that violate the
presumption of fiduciary duty to shareholders without objection from courts, such as filing
bankruptcy, triangular mergers, mergers into a shell company that eliminate a class of
stock, structuring a merger as an asset sale to eliminate shareholders’ appraisal rights, and
declaring in-kind dividends without regard to tax consequences to shareholders); Daniel J.
H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69
S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1038–45 (199–6) (arguing that the shareholders whom directors
represent are a fictional abstraction without the legal rights real principals have over real
agents, being powerless, e.g., to initiate actions, bind directors as agents, or terminate
directors as agents); Ethan G. Stone, Business Strategists and Election Commissioners: How the
Meaning of Loyalty Varies with the Board’s Distinct Fiduciary Roles, 31 J. CORP. L. 893, 922, 930
n.164 (2006) (describing the relationship between shareholders and directors as more
accurately resembling beneficiary/trustee than principal/agent).
55
Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1293. Written by three of the principal participants, this
paper recounts how standards of review evolved in adjudication of particular cases. The
key decisions that reshaped Delaware corporate law, discussed infra, were: Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 880 (Del. 1985) (establishing a so-called gross negligence standard of
review for directors’ duty of care—soon effectively removed by 65 Del. Laws ch. 28g, §§ 1–
2 (1986) (current version 8 DEL. CODE tit.8 § 102(b)(7) (2009)), which allowed corporations
to insulate directors from liability for damages); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 957–58 (Del. 1985) (holding that in takeover cases directors must be reasonable in
both perceiving a threat to the corporation and in crafting a defensive response—an
intermediate standard); Moran v. Household Int’l., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1352 (Del. 1985)
(holding that “poison pill” defense is legal under Delaware law); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986) (holding that once a transfer of control
is inevitable, directors’ duty is to obtain the best possible sale price for shareholders—a
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[r]equired to develop a body of rules to impose legal
order upon . . . (a dynamic revolution in corporate
merger activity) . . . , the Delaware courts employed the
fiduciary duty doctrine to evaluate the decisions of
corporate directors in a multitude of circumstances . . . .
The end result was the articulation by Delaware courts
of new standards of review in cases such as Unocal,
Revlon, and Blasius . . . .”56
Before considering how fiduciary duties apply to corporate elections,
the following sections briefly review the key decisions that shaped the
law of fiduciary duties between corporate directors and shareholders:
the duties of care and loyalty, special duties in the context of selling a
company or defending against a hostile takeover bid, the duty of good
faith, the duty of disclosure, and how context conditions the
interpretation of fiduciary duties.
1.

Duty of Care

Duty-of-care claims charge that directors acted without taking
sufficient care to ensure that their decisions were good for the
corporation; such claims are essentially about negligence.57 Not wanting
to deter risk-taking, Delaware courts long avoided finding liability so
long as directors acted in subjective good faith, and set a lenient gross-

different intermediate standard); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 668 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (holding that board action taken to thwart the shareholder vote will not be
upheld absent a compelling justification); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d
1140, 1153–54 (Del. 1990) (holding that under the Unocal standard the board may
reasonably defend against substantive coercion, i.e., the threat that shareholders will
disbelieve the board’s reasons for opposing an unsolicited bid); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75,
78 (Del. 1992) (holding that Unocal analysis applies to any defensive measure involving
issues of control, even if it implicates voting rights); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d
345, 361 (Del. 1993) (holding that rebuttal of business judgment rule will subject directors to
entire fairness review, i.e., the duty-of-loyalty standard); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 1994) (holding that either a change-of-control transaction
or defensive measures may trigger enhanced scrutiny, which includes judicial review of
board’s decision-making and actions); and Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1372–73 (Del. 1995) (holding that board’s action under Unocal analysis must be
proportionate, neither precluding nor coercing shareholders’ exercise of voting rights).
56
Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1294.
57
Id. at 1299-1300 (“[T]he Delaware supreme court, although purporting to apply the
gross negligence standard of review, in reality applied an ordinary negligence
standard . . . . [It] withdrew much of the comfort and greater incentive for risk-taking
promised by that more lenient standard.”)
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negligence standard for the duty of care.58 However, the standard soon
was interpreted more strictly in Smith v. Van Gorkom, in which the court
found a board liable for damages because it did not investigate and
deliberate sufficiently, even though the buyout offer it approved realized
a 40% control premium for shareholders.59 The Delaware legislature
promptly provided for elimination of directors’ duty-of-care liability.60
Delaware statutes also afford broad protection to directors when they
rely on reports or advice from persons with professional expertise.61 As
in Van Gorkom, later duty-of-care cases focus on the sufficiency of a
board’s decision-making process.62
2.

Duty of Loyalty

In claimed breaches of the duty of loyalty, involving self-dealing,
usurpation of a corporate opportunity, or other conflicts of interest,
directors must satisfy a stringent “intrinsic fairness” standard.63 If
58
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Allen et al., supra note 15, at
1299 (gross negligence is “a standard facially far more lenient than the simple ‘negligence’
standard of conduct.”).
59
488 A.2d at 880 (Del. 1985) (holding directors liable for deciding to accept buyout offer
after insufficient diligence in reviewing the offer and alternatives).
60
The new provision enacted in 1986 enables a Delaware corporation to amend its
certificate of incorporation to include “[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for
breach of fiduciary duty” in duty-of-care cases but not for breach of the duty of loyalty,
bad-faith actions, or self-dealing transactions. 65 Del. Laws ch. 28g, §§ 1–2 (1986), codified
as DEL. STAT. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2009). Exculpatory provisions have since become nearly
universal in Delaware corporations’ articles of incorporation. See In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 65 (Del. 2006) (“Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL . . . authorizes
Delaware corporations, by a provision in the certificate of incorporation, to exculpate their
directors from monetary damage liability for a breach of the duty of care.”).
61
DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 141(e) (2009) provides:
[a] member of the board of directors . . . shall . . . be fully protected in
relying in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon
such information, opinions, reports or statements presented to the
corporation by any of the corporation’s officers or employees, or
committees of the board of directors, or by any other person as to
matters the member reasonably believes are within such other person’s
professional or expert competence and who has been selected with
reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.
62
E.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (“Due care in the decision[-]making context is process due
care only.”). Shareholders alleged breach of fiduciary duty after The Walt Disney
Company’s board of directors approved a $140 million severance package for a dismissed
former president; the court held that the board had relied in good faith on expert advice
concerning the former president’s employment agreement. Id. at 248, 261.
63
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (self-dealing, through a
parent corporation’s domination of a subsidiary, breaches the duty of loyalty to minority
shareholders). In In re eBay S’holders Litig., 2004 WL 253521 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2004), the
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directors’ financial interests diverge from shareholders’ interests, the
protections of the business judgment rule and exculpatory provisions do
not apply; in such cases, directors must show that both the process and
the price in a financial transaction were fair to the corporation and
shareholders, or obtain ratification of the challenged transaction by
shareholders or disinterested directors.64
When corporate takeover battles produced cases that fell between
the straightforward duty-of-care and duty-of-loyalty standards, the
Delaware courts developed intermediate standards of review to deal
with them; over time, two intermediate standards came to control most
decisions, depending on whether the issue was sale of the company or
control of the board.65
3.

Best Price in Sale of Company

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. established a
standard of review that applies when the sale of a company or
substantially all of its assets is in process.66 Reasoning that changed
circumstances alter a board’s fiduciary responsibilities, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that once the Revlon board understood that sale of
the corporation was inevitable, the directors’ duty to shareholders
“changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company.”67 Post-Revlon, if sale of the company becomes inevitable, the
board no longer enjoys managerial discretion in decision-making—its
duty is to seek the best price for shareholders.68
court refused to dismiss a suit claiming defendant directors of eBay usurped a corporate
opportunity. Id. at 5. As “thanks” for directing eBay business to them, investment bankers
had allocated to the individual directors dozens of IPO positions that afforded them many
millions of dollars of quick profits; the court found grounds, sufficient to withstand a
dismissal motion, that this gratuity was improperly diverted from the corporation,
constituting a breach of the directors’ duty of loyalty. Id. at 1.
64
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 92 (Del. 2001) (“unless there is a violation of
the duty of loyalty or the duty of good faith, a trial on the issue of entire fairness is
unnecessary because a Section 102(b)(7) provision will exculpate director defendants from
paying monetary damages that are exclusively attributable to a violation of the duty of
care.”) Accord Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710–11 (Del. 1983) (“[W]here one
stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness,
sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts . . . . The concept of fairness has
two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.”).
65
Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1312.
66
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
67
Id. at 182. The Revlon board approved a merger and then enacted “lock-up”
defensive measures against other bidders. Id. at 176–79.
68
Id. at 182. The court held that, having decided on a transfer of control, directors were
bound to seek the best price for shareholders and could not play favorites among
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Anti-Takeover Defenses

The decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. determined a
standard for reviewing a board’s defensive actions in a contest for
control: when a board adopts anti-takeover measures, it must show both
that it reasonably perceived the bid as a threat to corporate effectiveness
and policy, and that the defensive measures were a reasonable response
to the threat.69 Ten years later, in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,
the court further clarified the reasonableness of defensive measures: “if
the board of directors’ defensive response is not draconian (preclusive or
coercive) and is within a ‘range of reasonableness,’ a court must not
substitute its judgment for the board’s.”70
In Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., the court directly addressed
how shareholders’ voting franchise relates to the board’s legitimacy.71
The Blasius test requires that if the plaintiff can show the board acted
with the primary purpose to thwart shareholders’ voting rights, then the
board must show a compelling justification for its action, even if it acted
competing bidders. Id. at 184. In further clarifying Revlon duties, the courts have held that
directors may seek the best price by a variety of methods, including single-bidder
negotiations supplemented by an effective market check as an alternative to conducting an
auction. Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1321.
69
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). As part of its rationale, the Unocal court noted the
inherent danger when a threat to control is involved; directors are necessarily confronted
with a conflict of interest, making an objective decision difficult. Id., quoting Bennett v.
Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962). But cf. Solomon, 747 A.2d at 1126 (“In most circumstances
Delaware law . . . rejects the notion that a director’s interest in maintaining his office, by
itself, is a debilitating factor.”).
70
651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995), quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network,
Inc., 637 A.2d at 45–46. In its reasoning about proportionate responses, the court also
discussed its decision applying Unocal in Moran v. Household Int’l., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1357 (Del. 1985), in which the board’s response was proportionate because it did not “strip”
the stockholders of their right to receive tender offers and did not fundamentally restrict
proxy contests. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387. In Williams v. Geier, the court stated that
wrongful coercion may exist where a party takes actions that cause shareholders to vote for
some reason other than the merits of the transaction. 671 A.2d 1368, 1382–83 (Del. 1996).
71
564 A.2d 651, 669 (Del. Ch. 1988) (invalidating a board’s actions to increase its size
with friendly new directors when incumbent directors admitted they had acted to thwart
the election of a new board majority and the board lacked a compelling justification). Even
though directors, facing a shareholder consent proposal to reconstitute the board, had
acted on their view of the corporation’s best interest, their action was “an offense to the
relationship between corporate directors and shareholders . . . .” Id. at 652. Because of the
intended effect on an impending vote of shareholders, Chancellor Allen saw the board’s
action not as exercising the corporation’s power, rights or obligations, but as involving the
legal and equitable obligations of an agent to a principal—a question that may not be left to
the agent’s sole business judgment. Id. at 660. Even if the board knew better than
shareholders what was best for the company, only the shareholders have the right to
determine who should be on the board, and therefore the board’s action was a violation of
its duty of loyalty to shareholders. Id. at 663.
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in good faith.72 The courts have applied Blasius in cases that involve a
board’s overt manipulation of the voting process, for example, in setting
the date of a shareholders’ meeting, by enacting onerous notice
requirements for shareholder-initiated proxy proposals, by limiting
access to the list of registered shareholders, or by abuse of the power to
chair the shareholders’ meeting.73
In Stroud v. Grace and further in Unitrin, the Delaware Supreme
Court subsumed the Blasius standard within the second step of the
Unocal analysis (reasonableness of defensive measures), applicable when
the issue of control is present.74 As a result, in the evolved UnocalId. at 662–63. The decision drew on precedents where the board acted to tamper with
the election process; see Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 437 (Del. 1971)
(board advanced date of annual meeting to handicap dissident shareholders’ proxy efforts);
Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206 (Del. Ch. 1987) (board postponed annual
meeting to disadvantage insurgent proxy holders). The Blasius decision added the
“compelling justification” burden, to clarify that invalidation of board action was not a per
se rule. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 662.
73
Compare Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 296–97 (Del.Ch. 2000) (board
unilaterally enacted a by-law requiring a super-majority to overcome an anti-takeover
defense), and State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. Civ. A. 17637, 2000 WL
1805376 at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (despite having a quorum, board adjourned meeting to
selectively solicit additional proxies favoring its proposal, which otherwise would have
lost), and MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1121 (Del. 2003) (board increased
its size to dilute voting power of directors elected by insurgent shareholders), and Portnoy
v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43, 46–47 (Del. Ch. 2008) (where a threatened incumbent
board had coordinated vote-buying and manipulated conduct of annual meeting, court
ordered new election), with Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 91–92 (Del. 1992) (board’s control
was not threatened and 78 percent of shareholders approved a board proposal to amend
bylaws; the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Blasius test did not apply), and Stahl v.
Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1117–18 (Del. Ch. 1990) (in response to a tender offer, a
board delayed a meeting that had been contemplated but was not required; the court found
no disenfranchisement that would invoke the Blasius test). Delaware courts appear less
likely to apply Blasius in cases involving a board decision about a business transaction than
when the dispute is purely a matter of board power. See David C. McBride & Danielle
Gibbs, Voting Rights: The Metaphysics of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 26 DEL. J. CORP. L.
927, 936 (2001) (reviewing consistency and usefulness of the Blasius doctrine); Velasco,
supra note 27 at 657–59 (2007) (proposing expanding the application of Blasius whenever
there is intent to interfere with shareholders’ voting rights, not only where a plaintiff can
prove interference was the primary purpose, arguing that corporation law specifically
allocates voting rights to shareholders as a balance against broad powers allocated to
boards of directors and any interference should therefore be subject to close scrutiny).
74
Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92 n.3 (court must apply Unocal where the board adopts a
defensive measure that touches on issues of control); Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1379 (under
Unocal, enhanced scrutiny of defensive measures means they must not preclude or coerce
shareholder choices and must be in a range of reasonableness); accord MM Cos., 813 A.2d at
1130 (court must protect shareholders’ franchise within Unocal’s requirement that defensive
measures be proportionate and reasonable in relation to the threat); see also Allen et al.,
supra note 15, at 1316 (Delaware courts gradually “folded” the Blasius standard into
Unocal).
72
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Unitrin-Blasius standard, a court first determines whether the board’s
perception of a threat to the corporation and its response to the threat are
reasonable; if so, it applies the business judgment rule. If not, and if the
board’s defensive response directly involves shareholders’ voting rights,
the Unitrin analysis (whether a defensive measure coerces or precludes
effective voting by shareholders) examines also the Blasius question of
the board’s subjective intent in adopting the defensive measure.75
5.

Duty of Good Faith

In contrast to the better understood duties of care and loyalty, the
legal meaning of the duty of good faith was foggy until 2005, when
Chancellor Chandler gave it definition in In re Walt Disney Company
Derivative Litigation, stating that “intentional dereliction of duty, a
conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities” is a valid (but not the
exclusive) standard for determining good faith.76 Breach of the duty of
75
Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1312–16 (discussing how, once poison pills made
replacement of the board essential to corporate takeover strategies, considerations of equity
led the courts to evolve the Blasius doctrine to look much like the Unocal/Unitrin standard).
Allen et al. opine that Unocal/Unitrin analysis is adequate so long as judges keep a “gimlet
eye out for inequitably motivated electoral manipulations” and recommend that the
Supreme Court should formally unify the Unocal/Unitrin and Blasius doctrines. Id. at 1316.
See Mercier v. Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing the evolved
reasonableness standard and—uniquely—finding that a board had satisfied the Blasius
“compelling justification” standard).
76
907 A.2d 693, 754–55 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). Acknowledging
that the duty of good faith is “[s]hrouded in the fog of . . . hazy jurisprudence,” Chancellor
Chandler stated that:
[u]pon long and careful consideration, I am of the opinion
that . . . intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one's
responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the only) standard for
determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith. Deliberate
indifference and inaction in the face of a duty to act is, in my mind,
conduct that is clearly disloyal to the corporation.
Id.; accord Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369, 372 (Del. 2006) (holding that test of oversight
liability, sustained or systematic failure of board to exercise oversight, relies on the duty of
good faith, as instance of failure to act in the face of a known duty to act). See generally
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006). In
Eisenberg’s formulation, the elements of the duty of good faith are subjective honesty or
sincerity, conformity to generally accepted corporate norms and standards of business
decency, and fidelity to office. Id. at 26. He notes that “intentional” and “conscious”
should be interpreted as meaning “either that the manager was conscious that he was
disregarding his duties or that a reasonable person in the manager’s position would have
known that he was disregarding his duties” so that denial of subjective intent or awareness
is not an adequate defense. Id. at 72. Eisenberg discusses Vice Chancellor Strine’s view
that loyalty subsumes good faith, but rejects this view in favor of the three-way distinction.
Id. at 12–13. The Delaware Supreme court has confusingly come down on both sides of the
question, referring to the three primary fiduciary duties in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
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good faith is less often a basis for liability than a threshold condition to
remove protection of the business judgment rule.77 Delaware law does
not allow exculpation or indemnification of bad faith actions.78
6.

Duty of Disclosure

When the board requests shareholder action, shareholders have the
right to make an informed decision, and directors have a specific duty to
disclose accurately all available material information, which Delaware
courts consider an instance of the duties of care, loyalty, and good faith,
rather than a distinct fiduciary duty.79 The duties of care, loyalty, and
good faith obligate directors to deal honestly with shareholders in any
public or direct communication.80 Further, SEC Rule 14a-9 imposes
liability for false or misleading disclosures in proxy statements.81
7.

Fiduciary Duties in Context

Professor Stone attempts to resolve apparent contradictions in key
decisions on fiduciary duty by identifying two distinct sets of powers
634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1994); accord Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001),
but describing the requirement to act in good faith as a subsidiary element of the
fundamental duty of loyalty in Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
77
Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1145 (Del. 1990) (requiring directors to
demonstrate good faith before enjoying the presumption of the business judgment rule).
See also Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 73.
78
DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2009) (allowing corporations to exculpate directors from
monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care but explicitly excludes breaches of the
duty of good faith and loyalty); § 145(a) (2009) (corporations may indemnify any person
acting for the corporation if the person acted in good faith).
79
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998) (disclosure duty is implicated when the
board requests shareholder action, and the test applied is materiality of the information to
the issue put before shareholders; the cause of action does not include reliance, causation,
or actual damages). Accord Stroud, 606 A.2d at 85 (duty to disclose material facts that
would significantly affect the shareholder vote).
80
Malone, 722 A.2d at 10 (reversing dismissal of complaint with prejudice, where there
was evidence that directors knowingly made false disclosures). The court held that
directors violate their fiduciary duty if they “knowingly disseminate false information”
that results in injury to the corporation or a shareholder, and stated that the director’s
fiduciary duty is not intermittent but “the constant compass” to guide directors’ actions.
Id. at 9–10. Even when the board is not seeking shareholder action, the duties of care, good
faith, and loyalty apply; dissemination of false information could violate one of those
duties. Id. at 13. Accord O’Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, Inc., 745 A.2d 902, 916 (1999).
81
17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9 (2007). Scienter is not required in proving a violation of Rule 14a9: “a proxy solicitation that contains a misleading representation or omission violates the
section even if the issuer believed in perfect good faith that there was nothing misleading
in the proxy materials.” Beck v. Dobrowski, 559 F.3d 681, 682 (7th Cir. 2009). Pending rule
changes to increase shareholders’ access to proxies will impose the same requirement on
shareholders who nominate director candidates. 74 Fed. Reg. 29024 (June 18, 2009).
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exercised by boards of directors—each having a distinct purpose that
implies its own standard for fiduciary duty.82 He distinguishes a board’s
operating power, through which a board makes or delegates decisions
about conducting the corporation’s business affairs, from a coordinating
power, the power to manage collective action by shareholders in voting
or selling their shares.83 Powers and duties vary with context: just as
Revlon duties arise when it becomes clear a company is going to be sold,
special board duties arise in the context of an election—these duties,
such as the duty of disclosure, facilitate decisions that corporation law
reserves for a shareholders’ vote rather than for a board’s judgment.84
D. Holding Securities “in Street Name”
The following sections discuss complex arrangements that
developed over the last four decades to enable the growth and efficiency
of modern securities markets—arrangements that in many respects clash
with presumptions embodied in corporation law.85 First to be discussed
82
Stone, supra note 54, at 928. Stone analyzes apparent inconsistency in the courts’
treatment of conflicts of interest and in whether fiduciary duty is owed to shareholders or
to the corporate enterprise, especially in applying Unocal and Blasius doctrines, tracing
differences between decisions to differences in the powers the board is exercising in each
case. Id. at 912.
83
Id. at 913–17. Citing various decisions of Delaware courts, Stone argues that the
courts recognize this distinction, even if they have not articulated it clearly. Context alters
a board’s fiduciary duties, just as it does in a case controlled by the Revlon rule. See supra
note 66 and accompanying text.
84
Stone, supra note 54, at 900, 920. The board’s role is to use its coordinating power to
assist the shareholders to make their decision effectively, even if the board disagrees with
the decision. Id. at 924. In short, the board’s role is ministerial—“involv[ing] obedience to
instructions or laws instead of discretion, judgment, or skill . . . .” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 457 (3d pocket ed. 2006). Chancellor Allen reasoned in Blasius:
[T]he ordinary considerations to which the business judgment rule
originally responded are simply not present in the shareholder voting
context. . . . A board’s decision to act to prevent the shareholders from
creating a majority of new board positions and filling them does not
involve the exercise of the corporation’s power over its property, or with
respect to its rights or obligations; rather, it involves allocation,
between shareholders as a class and the board, of effective power with
respect to governance of the corporation.
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988).
85
Considerable complexity results from the interaction of three legal principles:
The only persons entitled to vote are registered owners on the
record date . . . .
A beneficial holder who permits his or her shares to be held by
another in nominee or fiduciary capacity relinquishes the direct right
to participate in corporate affairs . . .
. . . [but] the record owner has no right to vote the shares contrary
to the wishes of the beneficial owner.
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is the arrangement by which the industry eliminated the transfer of
paper share certificates. Second is the now-ubiquitous practice of
custodial shareholding by intermediaries, which complicates voting.
Third is the convoluted set of procedures by which a corporation
conducts a vote of shareholders when a vote is required. Fourth is the
procedure for counting the vote in corporate elections.
1.

“Immobilization” of Shares

In times past, hundreds of messengers scurried around Wall Street
transporting stock certificates and checks between offices; by the 1960s,
this method of settling trades resulted in a back-office crisis that
forestalled further growth of the markets and even forced the stock
exchanges to severely cut back trading hours.86 Beginning in the early
1970s, the industry developed a solution: by “immobilizing” physical
stock certificates in a central depository and recording changes of
ownership using book-entry accounting methods, they could eliminate
the bottleneck attendant to paper-based transactions.87
In the United States today, about 85% of shares are held in street
name by brokers or banks, for themselves or as custodians for customers,
rather than being registered with the issuing company.88 These shares
are deposited with The Depository Trust Company (“DTC”), which
keeps track of who owns them by electronic bookkeeping entries; DTC’s
affiliate Cede & Co. is the shareholder of record on the issuing

A. Gilchrist Sparks III & Michael Houghton, The Mechanics of Stockholder Voting Under
Delaware Law, and Conducting an Annual Stockholders’ Meeting of a Delaware Corporation, in
SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS AND SHAREOWNER CONTROL IN TODAY’S SECURITIES MARKETS, at
433, 435 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 507, 1985).
86
David C. Donald, The Rise and Effects of the Indirect Holding System: How Corporate
America Ceded its Shareholders to Intermediaries, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität,
Institute for Law and Finance, Working Paper No. 68, 9–10 (2007),
http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/volltexte/2007/4885/pdf/ILF_WP_068.pdf.
From 1960 to 1968 trading volume quadrupled; the back-office crisis was brokers’ inability
to settle the transactions. Id. at 10. In some brokerage firms, the backlog of transactions
grew to exceed in value the firms’ total assets. Id. at 9. Over 100 firms failed or were
acquired. Id. It took four years after one firm was liquidated to sort out its backlog of
paper transactions. Id. at 12.
87
15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(e) (2000) (as amended in 1975, § 17A(e) of the Securities and
Exchange Act requires all exchange-traded securities to be immobilized); see also Donald,
supra note 86, at 17-19. Donald observes that intermediaries in effect replaced corporations
as the “issuers” of the dematerialized “securities,” which were then transferred as claims
against their custody accounts; they also replaced shareholders as the persons registered on
corporations’ stockholders lists. Id.
88
SEC, Briefing Paper:
Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics (May 23, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm.
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company’s stock register.89 When investors buy and sell shares in a
brokerage account, DTC settles trades by calculating each day the net
change in brokers’ and banks’ share balances; brokers and banks
perform similar net accounting for purchases and sales in their
customers’ accounts through as many tiers of custodial relationship as
necessary.90
This “indirect holding system” streamlined the process of clearing
trades at the cost of obscuring share ownership: under this system, the
true beneficial owner who holds equitable title91 is not the record
shareholder that state corporation laws recognize.92 Besides obscuring
the owner’s identity, indirect holding also obscures the quantity owned.
Although corporation law (like the naïve investor) views a shareholder
89
Donald, supra note 86, at 23. See also Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., An
Introduction to DTCC Services and Capabilities 3 (April 2008), http://www.dtcc.com/
downloads/about/Introduction_to_DTCC.pdf (DTC retains custody of 3.5 million
securities issues, worth about $40 trillion, including securities issued in the US and more
than 110 other countries); Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 2007 Transaction Statistics and
Performance, http://www.dtcc.com/about/business/statistics.php (In 2007, DTC’s affiliate,
National Securities Clearing Corp., settled 13.5 billion securities transactions valued at
more than $1.8 quadrillion).
90
John C. Wilcox, John J. Purcell III, & Hye-Won Choi, “Street Name” Registration & The
Proxy Solicitation Process, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES
12-6 (Amy L. Goodman & John F. Olson eds., 3rd ed. Supp. 2007) (in most transactions,
DTC legally owns shares both before and after the trade, merely shifting them between
accounts of intermediaries). See also Prefatory Note to UCC § 8-101 (1994).
91
Prefatory Note to UCC § 8-101 (1994); UCC §§ 8-102(7), 8-102(17) and comment 17
(1994). The holder of shares in street name holds a security entitlement, effective when the
intermediary (a broker, bank, or trustee) credits acquired shares to the shareholder’s
account. UCC § 8-501(b) (1994). This security entitlement is not a claim to specific
property, but rather the right to enforce a claim against the intermediary to deliver all
property rights associated with the shares. UCC § 8-503(b) and comment 2. The beneficial
owner holds the entitlement in common with other entitlement holders, each having a pro
rata claim against the intermediary’s holdings of the security. Id. comment 1. Under the
indirect holding rules, it is immaterial whether the intermediary actually owns sufficient
shares that it can credit to the beneficial owners. Id.; UCC § 8-501(c) (1994). In those
instances, now rare, where beneficial owners are also owners of record, the lack of an
account record with an intermediary means traditional property law applies to the holding
rather than the UCC Article 8 rules. See also Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-3 (DTC is
merely custodian and has no beneficial interest in shares). See generally Kahan & Rock,
supra note 45, at 1240–43 (summarizing provisions of UCC Article 8 that are relevant to the
indirect holding system).
92
DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 219(c) (2009) (stock ledger the only evidence as to who are the
stockholders); § 262 (2009) (allowing only the record owner to claim appraisal rights); see
Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d 464, 469–70 (Del. 1995) (continuing to recognize rule that
a corporation may rely on its stock ledger to determine who is eligible to vote or exercise
other rights of a stockholder); accord Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 494 (Del. 1989)
(record ownership determines who may vote); Williams v. Sterling Oil of Okla., Inc., 267
A.2d 630, 634 (Del. Ch. 1970) (“exclusive right of registered owners to vote”), rev’d on other
grounds, 273 A.2d 264 (Del. 1971).
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as owner of a determinate number of shares, under Article 8 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, what the shareholder legally owns is a pro
rata interest, in common with all other customers of the broker, in a
fungible mass of like securities that the broker holds.93 The fungible
mass is a continually varying quantity of shares held by custodians, with
no specific shares being attributed to specific customers.94 As a result,
the number of shares shown in a customer’s account only approximates
the number of shares that the customer is legally entitled to vote.
2.

Assignment of Proxy

Assigning a proxy establishes a seemingly straightforward agency
relationship, by which the owner of shares grants authority to another to
vote the shares according to the owner’s instructions.95 But the

UCC § 8-503 (1994); SEC, supra note 88. See also UCC § 8-511 (1994) (although the
beneficial owner’s claim to the financial asset is superior to claims of general creditors,
purchasers of that security from the broker and creditors who obtained a security interest
have claims superior to the beneficial owner’s claim).
94
In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. No. Civ. A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2007), at *2 (“[N]o investor who might ultimately have a beneficial interest
in securities registered to Cede, has any ownership rights to any particular share of stock
reflected on a certificate held by Cede.”). See supra note 91.
95
DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 212(b) (2009) (authorizes shareholders to appoint a proxy); Duffy v.
Loft, 151 A. 223, 227 (Del. Ch. 1930), aff’d 152 A. 849 (Del. 1930) (appointment of proxy
creates agency relationship, of which proxy card is evidence); McLain v. Lanova Corp., 39
A.2d 209, 212 (Del. Ch. 1944) (“[T]he holder of a proxy is an agent, and, within the scope of
his authority, has a certain fiduciary relation toward his principal . . . .”); accord Parshalle v.
Roy, 567 A.2d 19, 27 (Del. Ch. 1989) (“A ‘proxy’ or ‘proxy card’ is merely written evidence
of an agency relationship in which a principal [the shareholder of record entitled to vote]
authorizes an agent . . . to vote the principal’s shares with respect to the matters and in the
manner specified in the proxy.”). The proxyholder’s agency powers are limited by terms
granted in the proxy:
A stockholder who is present in person or represented . . . by a general
proxy is present for quorum purposes and is also voting power present
on all matters. However, if the stockholder is represented by a limited
proxy and does not empower its holder to vote on a particular
proposal, then the shares represented by that proxy cannot be
considered as part of the voting power present with respect to that
proposal.
Berlin, 552 A.2d at 493. In North Fork Bancorp. v. Toal the court held (making a finer
distinction than in Berlin) that a limited proxy that withholds authority to vote for a
proposal does not withhold all voting power but only power to cast a particular vote on
that question, and so is properly considered voting power present with respect to that
proposal. 825 A.2d 860, 868–69 (Del. Ch. 2000), aff’d 781 A.2d 693 (Del. 2001).
It is apparent that recent cases treating proxy assignment powers either maintain the
now-obsolete presumption that a legal owner with the power to assign a proxy is also the
beneficial owner or use the term ‘proxy’ indiscriminately to denote either proxy or voting
instructions.
93
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discrepancy between legal and beneficial ownership, involving tiers of
intermediaries, complicates matters.96 Although the registered owner
has the legal right to vote and to assign that right (a proxy), the beneficial
owner has the right in equity to direct how proxyholders vote (through
voting instructions, sometimes confusingly called assignment of
proxy).97 Assignment of proxy creates an elaborate agency relationship
that runs in a chain from the legal owner (usually Cede & Co.) through
intermediary brokers and banks and Broadridge to the beneficial
owner.98 Voting instructions create an elaborate agency relationship
running in the reverse direction.99 But—just as with directors’ fiduciary
duties in conducting elections fairly— proxyholders’ fiduciary duties as
agents are theoretical only, because the courts hold that the beneficial
owner bears the risk of a proxyholder’s errors in voting.100
See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
Freeman v. Fabiniak, No. Civ. A. 8035, 1985 WL 11583 (Del.Ch. Aug. 15, 1985)
(holding it inequitable to allow a mere record holder to vote shares contrary to the true
owner’s wishes); SEC Rule 14A-4(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(e) (2007) (providing that shares
be voted in accordance with beneficial owner’s instructions). See NYSE Rule 452,
http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_2&manual=
/nyse/ nyse_rules/nyse-rules/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2009) (“A member organization shall
give or authorize the giving of a proxy for stock registered in its name, or in the name of its
nominee, at the direction of the beneficial owner[,]” and “[w]here a member organization
gives a subsequent proxy, it should clearly indicate whether the proxy is in addition to, in
substitution for or in revocation of any prior proxy.”). See also Len v. Fuller, No. Civ. A.
15352, 1997 WL 305833 at *3–5 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1997) (in a close election contest, court
applied doctrine of equitable conversion to determine voting rights, ruling that an
equitable owner of shares had the right to compel a proxy from the record owner, where
the equitable owner had exercised a call option for the record owner’s shares but the sale
transaction had not yet closed).
98
See Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-3, 12-7, 12-9 to 12-10 (outlining the “daisy-chain”
of relationships). Only very rarely and on special request is proxy authority transferred all
the way to the ultimate beneficial owners, who thus do not have any legal right to vote their
shares; the legal right is retained by the broker or bank.
99
North Fork Bancorp., 825 A.2d at 868 (“[O]ne must look to the language
on . . . the . . . proxy cards [i.e., voting instruction forms] to determine the nature and extent
of the agency relationship created.”). See supra note 32; infra note 107.
100
Am. Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 136 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. 1957) (noting the
NYSE rule approvingly, but determining that the shareholder bore the risk of any failure of
a broker to fulfill voting instructions); Enstar Corp. v. Senouf, 535 A.2d 1351, 1354–55 (Del.
1987) (because street name registration is voluntary, shareholder must bear risks attendant
on holding shares through nominees; intermediary’s error in failing to make demand for
appraisal in name of record owner disqualified demand); Mainiero v. Microbyx Corp., 699
A.2d 320, 324 (Del. Ch. 1997) (investor choosing to hold shares other than as record owner
assumes risk); see also McLain v. Lanova Corp., 39 A.2d 209 (Del. Ch. 1944) (in the absence
of inequitable circumstances, the record owner can vote the stock); Duffy v. Loft, Inc., 151
A. 223 227 (Del. Ch. 1930) (authorized agents’ failure to produce and file their proxies at
stockholders meeting did not of itself destroy authority). But cf. Allison v. Preston, 651
A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Preston v. Allison, 650 A.2d 646, 649 (Del. 1994)
96
97
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If a beneficial owner does not provide voting instructions, stock
exchange rules have allowed the broker to vote the shares on routine
matters, usually following the Wall Street Rule, which presumes that
shareholders uniformly support management—and that if not, they
would sell their shares.101 (Effective for annual meetings scheduled after
January 1, 2010, the New York Stock Exchange abolished broker
discretionary voting for the election of directors.)102
If a beneficial owner withholds authority to vote for a director
candidate, the effect can vary. Because default rules prescribe plurality
voting, in an uncontested election of directors, a single favorable vote
suffices to elect the board’s candidate, and a shareholder’s decision to
cast votes for or withhold votes from an incumbent candidate makes no
difference whatsoever.103 On occasions when a majority vote is required,
withholding authority means the shares are considered present and
entitled to vote, but no vote will be recorded for them; because this
increases the denominator but not the numerator, in effect it counts
against the candidate.104
(confirming the general rule that a beneficial stockholder is afforded no relief if the agent
errs but enforcing the agent’s duty to vote according to a beneficial owner’s wishes because
nominee holding of shares was obligatory rather than voluntary under federal ERISA law);
Insituform of N. Am., Inc. v. Chandler, 534 A.2d 257, 271 (Del.Ch. 1987) (trustees and
investment managers, as distinguished from pure nominees, are not bound to follow
beneficial owner’s wishes). In the risk-of-proxyholder-error cases, it is apparent that what
the court calls a “proxy” is the voting instruction that the beneficial owner gave to the
intermediary, rather than the legal proxy that Cede & Co. assigned as record owner.
101
NYSE Rule 452, supra note 97. In opposition to the Wall Street rule, Bebchuk argues
that “for shareholders concerned that poor board performance is reducing the value of
their investment, the freedom to sell their shares [at a depressed price] is hardly an
adequate remedy.” Bebchuk, supra note 26, at 141.
102
SEC Release No. 34-60215 (July 1, 2009) approved, with amendments, changes to
NYSE Rule 452 that the NYSE first proposed in 2006.
103
DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 216(3) (2009) (unless bylaws provide otherwise, directors will be
elected by a plurality of votes of shares present and entitled to vote). See generally
American Bar Association, Section of Business Law, Committee on Corporate Laws,
Discussion Paper on Voting by Shareholders for the Election of Directors, June 22, 2005,
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL270000pub/directorvoting/200506210000
00.pdf (discussing the historical fear of failed elections owing to insufficient votes to satisfy
a majority standard). See Velasco, supra note 27, at 612 (noting that incumbent directors are
effectively immune to a shareholder vote and considers it misleading to say there is an
election or right to vote).
104
See DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 216(2) (2009) (requires affirmative vote of the majority of shares
present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject
matter for approval of proposals other than election of directors, unless otherwise
stipulated in the company’s charter or bylaws). See generally Licht v. Storage Technology
Corp., No. Civ. A. 524-N, 2005 WL 1252355 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2005) (summarizing the effect
of voting instructions and abstentions in various kinds of contests); Wilcox et al., supra note
90, at 12-16 (presenting a summary table of vote-tabulation rules); Catherine T. Dixon, The
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Proxy Statements

When a shareholder meeting approaches, state and federal laws
require a board of directors to communicate to shareholders the
substance of any matters subject to a vote.105 Delaware corporation law
envisions a simple process: Step 1, look in the official stockholders list
for names and addresses; Step 2, send the materials to those persons at
those addresses.106 But this is of course unrealistic; under the “indirect
holding system,” beneficial owners are traceable only through accounts
on the books of a pyramid of intermediaries.107 Even if communication
with owners could be simplified, solicitation of proxy or voting
instructions still must pass through each intermediary: to be legally
valid, the power of agency must bind each intermediary in an unbroken
chain between the record owner and the beneficial owner.108
To eliminate the cost and delay that a series of one-to-one handoffs
would entail, both issuers and intermediaries assign power of attorney to
Broadridge Financial Solutions to distribute disclosure information to
beneficial owners and to collect their voting instructions.109 Acting as the
SEC’s Expanded Requirements: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Tabulation Procedures and Results, 7
INSIGHTS 11, 16 (Dec. 1993) (including a table comparing rules for tabulating votes under
various states’ laws).
105
SEC Rule 14(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(b); DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 222 (2009).
106
DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 219(a) (2009); see also Donald, supra note 86, at 27; Soc’y of Corporate
Secy’s & Governance Prof’ls, supra note 46, at 1 (current proxy system is based on obsolete
assumptions that shareholders have a long-term economic interest, register their shares,
and trade rarely; its defects had less impact in former conditions than today).
107
Supra notes 88–90; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1242 (noting that the
Delaware voting paradigm does not take account of the modern system of custodial
ownership, particularly the indeterminacy of share ownership under UCC Article 8); cf.
Donald, supra note 86, at 63 (although masking of the beneficial owner’s identity was
incidental to the indirect holding system, brokers treat their customer lists as proprietary
information and resist sharing it with issuing companies); Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys &
Governance Prof’ls, supra note 46, at 5 (proxy communication and voting processes favor
interests of brokers and banks rather than interest of beneficial owners).
108
See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text on establishing a relationship of agency
by assigning proxy. The laws of agency apply to the proxy authority: the proxy, qua agent,
consents to act on behalf of the beneficial owner and subject to the beneficial owner’s
control. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). As the voting instructions pass
through intermediaries to the record owner or proxyholder who will cast the actual votes,
each intermediary is bound as a subagent (“a person appointed by an agent empowered to
do so, to perform functions undertaken by the agent for the principal”). Id. § 5.
109
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc., ProxyEdge, http://www.broadridge.com/
investor-communications/us/institutions/proxyedge.asp (Broadridge is the proxy agent
for 97% of U.S. banks and brokers). Although some other providers compete for some of
the services, because of Broadridge’s dominant market position, this Note will refer to
Broadridge as the provider of proxy distribution and tabulation services. See also Obara,
supra note 25, at 10-2. See also Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys & Governance Prof’ls, supra note
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agent of both issuer and intermediaries, Broadridge can compile mailing
lists and distribute proxy information and voting instruction forms
(“VIFs”) on their behalf110 without compromising confidentiality
required under Objecting Beneficial Owners rules that mask the
identities of a custodian’s customers.111
E. Conducting Corporate Meetings and Elections
The corporate election process is presented here step by step,
somewhat simplified, followed by a discussion of factors that contribute
to difficulty or confusion in counting the vote.
1.

Corporate Elections, Step by Step
THE ELECTION PROCESS, STEP BY STEP112
1

When an issuer announces a corporate election, it must identify
intermediaries holding its stock and ask them how many proxy
material packages they require for beneficial owners.113

2

The issuer issues an “omnibus proxy,” which confers voting
authority to banks and brokers with respect to the shares in their
DTC accounts on the record date.114 Brokers and banks transfer

46, at 5 (commenting on lack of competition and lack of incentive to contain costs of proxyrelated services because issuers pay for services that other parties price, procure, and
perform).
110
SEC, supra note 88.
111
SEC Rules 14b-1(b)(3) (beneficial owners may choose whether to be either Objecting
Beneficial Owners [OBOs] or Non-Objecting Beneficial Owners [NOBOs], applying to
brokers), 14b-2(b)(4)(ii)(B) (same, applying to banks). See also Donald, supra note 86, at 63
(although beneficial owners may have reasons to mask their identities from issuers, default
OBO provisions in brokerage account agreements apparently serve brokers’ interest: about
three fourths of beneficial owners are considered OBO, and brokers say releasing NOBO
lists would endanger their customers’ privacy, even though 88% of shareholders would
unconditionally provide the information to issuers). Cf. Bus. Roundtable, Request for
Rulemaking Concerning Shareholder Communications, Letter to SEC dated April 12, 2004, at 11,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-493.htm#P45_11983 (proposing that investors
who care about anonymity should bear the cost rather than pass the costs on to all
shareholders).
112
See Obara, supra note 33; see also Donald, supra note 86, at 29–33 (summarizing
customary procedures used in conducting corporate elections).
113
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-13(a)–(a)(1)(i)(A); 240.14a-13(a)(4)–(5); 240.14a-13, Note 1.
Determining beneficial owners is an iterative process that may involve multiple layers of
respondent banks and regional brokers. Donald, supra note 86, at 25.
114
Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-7. The issuer ordinarily acts through custodian Cede
& Co., which is the legal or record owner of shares. Id. at 12-10 to 12-11. Although banks
and brokers are assigned voting rights, stock exchange rules deny brokers (and contractual
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their proxy authority, through power of attorney, to
Broadridge.115
3

The issuer sends proxy disclosure packets to Broadridge for
distribution (on behalf of intermediaries) to beneficial owners.116
Broadridge sends required disclosures concerning questions
subject to a shareholder vote and a voting instruction form
VIF.117 (By contracting with intermediaries as well as issuers,
Broadridge can reduce cost and delay.)

4

The beneficial owner returns to Broadridge a VIF—general (in
favor of management’s proposals); limited (instructions to vote
in some other indicated way); or none.118 Until the polls close,
the beneficial owner may change voting instructions.

5

Broadridge tabulates incoming VIFs, and reports the
continuously updated master tabulation of voting results to
intermediaries and the issuer (but generally not to the
opposition).119 It is not customary for any party in this process

provisions usually deny banks) the right to decide how to vote. Id. at 12-8. Cf. Kahan &
Rock, supra note 45, at 1254 (no effort is made at this step to reconcile inconsistent records
of share positions among the issuer’s stock register, the Cede & Co. list, and the internal
records of custodians).
115
Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-10; Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Aug. 23, 2007).
116
17 CFR § 240.14b-1(c)(2)(i) requires issuers to reimburse intermediaries for the cost of
distributing proxy materials. Rule 14b-2 establishes a corresponding requirement for bank
intermediaries. Id. § 240.14b-2(a)(5)(c)(2)(i).
117
Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-10. It is significant that beneficial owners receive a
voting instruction form rather than a proxy card. Id. The broker retains the legal right to
vote shares or to grant proxy authority, and beneficial owners have the right only to
instruct the proxyholder how to vote their shares. Id. See also Bus. Roundtable, supra note
111, at 5.
118
See Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-12 to 12-13; SEC, supra note 88; Kahan & Rock,
supra note 45, at 1247–48; Broadridge, supra note 109. In principle, the beneficial owner
returns voting instructions to the broker or bank, but in practice most voting instructions
are collected by Broadridge through ProxyEdge®, its proprietary web-based voting facility,
or by mail. Broadridge, supra note 109. Broadridge acts for the intermediaries under
power of attorney. Id. ProxyEdge® uses a unique tracking number (functionally
comparable to a signature) for each beneficial owner, to authenticate instructions, reconcile
multiple instructions from the same beneficial owner, and report on aggregated vote
counts by categories of beneficial owners. Id. ProxyEdge® is a registered trademark of
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. Id.
119
Cf. Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc., 2008 Corporate Issuer Services Guide 26,
http://www.broadridge.com/investor-communications/us/corporations/pdfs/Part%205
%20Vote%20Proc%20Stp3.pdf. Broadridge’s service description continues:
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to issue written confirmation of voting instructions received (or
of how a proxyholder actually voted a beneficial owner’s
shares).
6

The broker or bank sends Broadridge a proxy, or a series of
incremental partial proxies, indicating aggregated shares voted
for and against each proposal or candidate.120 Discrepancies
often arise.121 If an overvote develops, the intermediary should

Broadridge issues voting results on behalf of our bank and broker
clients based on the schedule [fifteen days before the meeting, ten days
before the meeting, daily beginning on the ninth day before the
meeting, 7:00 p.m. the day before the meeting, and morning of the
meeting]. The voting results are issued on a “client proxy” and
provided to you or your designated agent. The voting results reported
reflect instructions received from beneficial shareholders and broker
discretionary voting if applicable. All share amounts are provided to
Broadridge by its bank and broker clients and are reflected on the
client proxy without modification by Broadridge.
Id. at 25.
Access to these progress reports enables management to redouble its proxy
solicitation efforts if votes received so far are not favorable with a comfortable margin.
Sometimes the insurgent opposition is led by an institutional investor that can obtain
reports direct from Broadridge or through its broker. However, institutional investors
have complained that reporting available from intermediaries “was not sufficiently robust
to guarantee that the information genuinely reflected their voting intentions . . . . [In one
instance, perplexed about a reported split vote,] [t]he investor called Broadridge to
investigate further, and was told there was no way of telling how the vote had been split.”
Thompson-Mann, supra note 13, at 11.
There is evidence that “[w]hen a retail shareowner using Broadridge’s proxyvote.com
platform votes for or against at least one item on a proxy but fails to vote on other items,
each item they fail to vote is cast in favor of the company’s recommended position.” James
McRitchie, SEC Petition 4-583 at 2 (May 15, 2009). This practice arguably does not comply
with SEC Rule 14a-4(b)(1), which requires prominent notice to the beneficial owner how
unspecified votes will be cast. Id. Representing Corporate Governance, McRitchie
petitioned the SEC to amend the rule to require that voter information forms, as well as
proxies, bind fiduciaries and warn security holders of the effect of their voting instructions.
Id. at 1. Broadridge’s defense relies on the technical distinction between a proxy and voting
instructions. Id. at 2.
120
Obara, supra note 33, at 10-13. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1253–54; see also
NYSE Rule 452, supra note 97, which has until now allowed a broker to vote on
discretionary questions (including an uncontested election of directors) for all street name
shares it holds for which it (or Broadridge) received no VIF, but may vote only in
accordance with the beneficial owner’s instructions on non-discretionary questions. For
the new revision of Rule 452, see supra note 102 and accompanying text. Cf. Wilcox et al.,
supra note 90, at 12-8 to 12-9 (remarking that the NYSE appears to permit the practice of
brokers assigning voting instructions received to any shares held [in the fungible mass], so
long as there is no overvote).
121
Obara, supra note 33, at 10-13. See, e.g., In re Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., Request for
Review of Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 05-045, 2006 WL 760710 *1–*3 (NYSE Feb. 15,
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amend its proxy to vote no more than the number of shares it is
entitled to vote; Broadridge forwards the proxies collected in
this way to the tabulator.122
UNCONTESTED
“ROUTINE”ELECTION

CONTESTED ELECTION OR PROXY
FIGHT

7a

The tabulator (often
Broadridge) forwards
collected proxies to the
meeting of
shareholders, with
information about
conflicting proxies,
overvotes, etc.123

7b

Each faction, having obtained
its proxies from Broadridge,
delivers them to the inspector
of election, who takes them to a
secure, neutral counting room.

8a

The inspector of
election oversees the
validation and
counting of proxies to
verify legality of the

8b

Proxies from registered owners
are segregated from broker and
bank proxies, and are sorted
into the same order as the
stockholder list. Each of the

2006) (NYSE fined Deutsche Bank for rule violations after investigation found overvotes in
twelve of fifteen instances tested in 2002 and eleven of twelve in 2003). See also Soc’y of
Corporate Sec’ys & Governance Prof’ls, supra note 46, at 3 (noting lack of verifiable audit
trail for votes and lack of any guarantee that beneficial owners will receive proxy materials
or have their votes counted).
122
SEC, supra note 88 (“If there is an over-vote, the broker-dealer will have to decrease
the customers’ vote but the customers will never know some or all of their votes did not
count.”). See also Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1260 (“cutting down the number of
voting instructions to the number of shares the broker is entitled to vote means that
someone (who?) must decide whose votes count”).
123
Stock exchange enforcement decisions are revealing:
There are no standard industry procedures that govern Tabulators’
approach to dealing with over-voting. Tabulators may respond to
over-votes with a variety of vote-counting procedures, including
counting votes on a “first in-first voted” or “last in-first voted” basis,
or disregarding altogether a vote submitted by a broker-dealer.
Depending upon the procedure implemented by the Tabulator, certain
customers’ voting instructions may not be represented as originally
given. . . . The lack of any uniform procedure raises the possibility that
Tabulators may employ procedures that cause votes to be lost.
NYSE Hearing Panel Decision 06-055 at *4, *6 (Apr. 18, 2006) (adjudication imposing
censure and a $600,000 fine where broker voted more shares than it was entitled to vote);
see also NYSE Hearing Panel Decision 07-028 at *1 (Mar. 8, 2007) (assessing $325,000 fine for
a similar infraction). It is worth noting that to the offending firms fines of this magnitude
are utterly insignificant, providing no incentive to alter their conduct.
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a quorum and the
official vote count).124
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inspector’s assistants takes a
group of proxies.

9a

The inspector examines
proxies, excluding
those that were not
properly executed (for
instance, lacking a
signature). Because the
outcome is
predetermined, little
effort need be
expended on validating
proxies.

9b

The inspector’s staff examines
registered owners’ proxies and
checks them against the
stockholder list, sorting proxies
into five categories: For
management, For the
opposition, Not on list
(invalid), Set aside (missing
signature, etc.), and Stand off
(conflicting proxies). The
assistants count proxies for
each faction and check each
other’s work.

10a

The inspector totals
votes cast for the
management slate of
director candidates.

10b

The staff attempts to resolve
partial proxies and revocations
for each intermediary. If the
result is an overvote, the staff
requests the intermediary’s
proxy clerk to bring the total
number of votes in line with
eligibility. If an overvote
cannot be resolved, the
inspector may disqualify some
or all of the intermediary’s
shares. The assistants count
proxies for each faction and
check each other’s work.125

124
DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 231(a) (2009) (corporations that list shares on a national exchange or
have more than 2,000 record shareholders must appoint inspectors of election for any
shareholders meeting; there are no statutory requirements for inspectors’ qualifications or
independence); Obara, supra note 33, at 10-8.
125
In the aggregation it is difficult to keep track of who has voted or changed a vote,
causing the need to adjust the count for overvotes, revocations of proxies, errors by
intermediaries, etc. See also Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1262 (discussing alternative
ways that intermediaries resolve overvotes and resulting distortions in the vote tally).
Kahan & Rock report that it is “entirely opaque” how Broadridge and its customers handle
these adjustments. Id. at 1253–54. Because VIFs are technically not proxies, Inspectors of
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The inspector totals the votes and certifies, in a report to the
meeting chair, the number of shares present and the votes cast
for and withheld from the proposals and slate(s) of candidates.
Then, the meeting chair reports the vote count and announces
the outcome—for instance, that there was a quorum, that certain
candidates were duly elected directors, or that the merger
proposal was approved.

Factors That Confuse the Vote Count

The complexity occasioned by multiple layers of nominee ownership
leads to such errors as unclear or lost voting instructions, with the
possibility for proxyholders to cast votes inconsistent with the beneficial
owner’s intentions.126 In addition, the fact that proxyholders aggregate
the voting instructions of multiple beneficial owners (which arrive and
are processed piecemeal) makes it difficult or impossible to verify
votes.127 Further, because key participants in this complex arrangement
derive profits from their roles in the process, they have no incentive to
streamline the layers.128
In most elections, many beneficial owners, especially those who have
small holdings, do not return voting instructions, resulting in an
undervote.129 Because shareholders have the right, but not the duty, to
vote their shares, the undervote does not affect legitimacy of the election,
Election may not review these source documents in case of any dispute arising during the
tabulation of voted proxies. Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-10.
126
Brandes Institute, supra note 13 at *7 (votes gone missing hampered investors’ efforts
to vote against excessive executive compensation); see also BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 25, at
9-10.1; supra note 106 and accompanying text. In Blasius, after reciting a virtual catalogue of
proxy-handling and counting errors in a consent contest, Chancellor Allen observed that
“[t]he multilevel system of beneficial ownership of stock and the interposition of other
institutional players between investors and corporations . . . renders the process of
corporate voting complex.” Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 668 (Del. Ch.
1988). In deciding the case, he concluded that “[w]e cannot know, in these circumstances,
what the outcome of this close contest would have been if the true wishes of all beneficial
owners had been accurately measured. The parties must . . . be content with the result
announced by the [inspectors].” Id. at 670.
127
Thompson-Mann, supra note 13, at 11 (reporting an occasion when Broadridge was
not able to account for how a split vote—92% for, 8% against—arose, contrary to the
institutional investor’s policy); Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1253 (describing factors
producing a “nightmare of verification”). Problems arise because intermediaries submit
aggregated partial proxies, obscuring the voting instructions of individual beneficial
owners. Id.
128
Thompson-Mann, supra note 13, at 11.
129
Inv. Assoc. v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 48 A.2d 501, 507 (Del. Ch. 1946) (taking
judicial notice of fact that many shareholders fail to vote). See also Bainbridge, supra note
27, at 635 n.89 (discussing rational apathy among small shareholders).
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but it may mask overvoting elsewhere.130 Under a soon-to-be obsolete
part of NYSE Rule 452, if a broker did not receive a beneficial owner’s
voting instructions on a routine question by ten days before the
shareholders’ meeting, the broker could vote the customer’s shares in its
own discretion.131
Determining who has voting rights is often difficult because brokers
lend shares from customers’ margin accounts to short sellers who sell
them at today’s price in the hope of replacing the borrowed shares at a
lower price later.132 When shares are lent, voting rights accompany
them, even though the original owner thinks (and her brokerage
statement will show) that the shares remain in her account.133 But
Cf. Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 493 (Del. 1989).
NYSE Rule 452, supra note 97. Routine questions include uncontested director
elections and appointment of auditors. Broker discretionary voting in director elections is
eliminated in a revision to Rule 452 effective at annual meetings scheduled after Jan. 1,
2010. SEC Release No. 34-60215 at 2 (July 1, 2009).
132
In re Digex, Inc., No. Civ. A. 18336-NC, 2002 WL 749184 at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2002)
(concisely describing mechanism of short selling and its implications). The court noted
that:
[w]ith regard to the share borrowed, both the shareholder from whom
it was borrowed and the third party to whom the share was sold are
beneficial owners. It is probable, if not certain, that neither the issuer
nor the beneficial owner from whom the stock was borrowed is aware
of the short sale . . . . Additionally, the borrowed share could be
borrowed from the account of the third-party buyer and sold to yet
another buyer. This would create an additional, a third, beneficial
owner for that one record share. Conceivably, this serial borrowing
could create a number of beneficial owners that was a multiple of the
number of shares actually issued.
Id. at *2 and n.9. A margin account allows the customer to purchase shares with funds
borrowed from the broker. A typical brokerage account agreement states:
[Broker] can loan out (to itself or others) the securities that collateralize
your margin borrowing. If it does, you may not be entitled to receive,
with respect to securities that are lent, certain benefits that normally
accrue to a securities owner, such as the ability to exercise voting
rights, or to receive interest, dividends, or other distributions.
Fidelity Investments, The Fidelity Account Customer Agreement 8, http://personal.
fidelity.com/accounts/pdf/trust_supplemental.pdf. It is evident how this practice can
produce discrepancies in share counts and voting rights. A concise account of the use of
borrowed shares to affect elections and manipulate share prices is Kara Scannell, How
Borrowed Shares Swing Company Votes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2007, at A1, based on Henry T.C.
Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership,
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 832–35 (2006); see also William L. Tolbert, Jr., Leslie H. Lepow & John
F. Cox, Borrowed Voting (American Enterprise Institute), 11 BRIEFLY . . . : PERSPECTIVES ON
LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND LITIGATION, No. 8, 1–21 2008.
133
NYSE Information Memo No. 07-8, Disclosure of Voting Loss and Dividend Status in
Margin Accounts (Jan. 23, 2007), http://apps.nyse.com/commdata/PubInfoMemos.nsf/
0/85256FCB005E19E88525726B00619047/$FILE/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20Document%
20in%2007-8.pdf. See also SEC, supra note 88; Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1256–57 (the
130
131

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 5

160

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

because the broker holds its own and customers’ shares in fungible bulk
at DTC,134 it does not decrement the lent shares from any particular
customer’s account, and there is no principled way to reconcile the
number of shares to which any account owns voting rights.135
Delaware courts have long been permissive in allowing the buying
and selling of votes, and in today’s markets it is possible to accumulate
effective voting power in secret using complex financial derivatives to
separate voting rights from economic interest.136 An example, involving
loan is actually a transfer of full legal title under an agreement to repurchase the shares,
and the possibly inadvertent lender thereby loses voting rights); Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys
& Governance Prof’ls, supra note 46, at 3 (in issuers’ view, integrity of the vote is impaired
by counting voting instructions for loaned shares and assigning them arbitrarily to unvoted
shares: for this reason, some shares are voted multiple times, others not at all); Tolbert et
al., supra note 132. Proxy solicitations typically disclose the possibility that the number of
shares to be voted may be adjusted downward, but this notice is often far from
conspicuous—for example, on the voting instruction form for the Foundry Networks, Inc.
special meeting on Dec. 17, 2008, this information is printed in light grey ink in small print
(eight-point small capitals) on the reverse side of the form. See supra note 37. Kahan &
Rock comment that short selling raises doubt whether votes were cast by investors who
actually owned shares, adducing the example that in 2004 the AXA/MONY merger was
approved by a margin of 1.7 million shares although 6.2 million shares were out on loan.
Supra note 45, at 1263.
134
See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
135
SEC, supra note 88. See NYSE Information Memo No. 04-58, Supervision of Proxy
Activities and Over-Voting, Nov. 5, 2004, http://apps.nyse.com/commdata/PubInfoMemos.
nsf/AllPublishedInfoMemosNyseCom/85256F09007311B485256F3F00645587/$FILE/Micr
osoft%20Word%20-%20Document%20in%2004-58.pdf (evidence that overvoting arises
from failures in accounting for lent shares); NYSE, NYSE Regulation, Inc. Fines UBS
Securities, Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) $1.35 Million
for Proxy-Handling Violations in Corporate Elections, NYSE News Release, June 13, 2006,
http://www.nyse.com/press/1150107128723.html.
136
Vote-buying arrangements, once considered a breach of shareholders’ fiduciary duty
to each other, have been allowed for over sixty years. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 25
(Del.Ch. 1982) (“an agreement involving the transfer of stock voting rights without the
transfer of ownership is not necessarily illegal[;] . . . [t]o hold otherwise would be to exalt
form over substance”), citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Circus Combined Shows,
Inc., v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947) (“a shareholder may exercise wide liberality of
judgment in the matter of voting . . . so long as he violates no duty owed his fellow
shareholders.”). Although shareholders may buy and sell votes, for management to use
corporate assets to buy votes and tilt a close election is a breach of the duty of loyalty.
Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43, 74–75 (Del. Ch. 2008).
A modern case involving derivatives is CSX Corp. v. The Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt.
(UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d 292 Fed. Appx. 133 (2d Cir. 2008) (in
spite of disclosure violations, hedge funds seeking control of CSX Corp. won the right to
vote four directors onto CSX’s board; the incumbent board had sought to enjoin hedge
funds’ voting power because, to evade disclosure requirements, they had purchased
derivatives rather than shares). The court found defendant hedge funds had amassed a
large economic position in CSX through total return swaps rather than purchasing shares,
in a scheme to avoid having to publicly disclose their large position until they were ready
to mount a proxy fight. Id. at 549–50. A swap contract can be unwound at any time by
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total return swaps, figured in the recent proxy fight at CSX Corp.137
Routine hedging of the short swap positions vested a significant amount
of voting power in parties who lacked the economic interest of bona fide
shareholders.138
agreement between the contracting parties; if settled in kind, rather than in cash, the long
party obtains full ownership, including attached voting rights, of a large shareholding that
has been accumulated in stealth. Id. at 522–24.
137
CSX, 562 F. Supp. at 516. The swaps gave the hedge funds “substantially all of the
indicia of stock ownership save the formal legal right to vote the shares.” Id. The court
explained the total return swaps (TRSs) at issue:
For example, in a cash-settled TRS with reference to 100,000
shares of the stock of General Motors, the short party agrees to pay to
the long party an amount equal to the sum of (1) any dividends and
cash flow, and (2) any increase in the market value that the long party
would have realized had it owned 100,000 shares of General Motors.
The long party in turn agrees to pay to the short party the sum of (1)
the amount equal to interest that would have been payable had it
borrowed the notional amount from the short party, and (2) any
depreciation in the market value that it would have suffered had it
owned 100,000 shares of General Motors.
In practical economic terms, a TRS referenced to stock places the
long party in substantially the same economic position that it would
occupy if it owned the referenced stock or security. There are two
notable exceptions. First, since it does not have record ownership of
the referenced shares, it does not have the right to vote them. Second,
the long party looks to the short party, rather than to the issuer of the
referenced security for distributions and the marketplace for any
appreciation in value.
The short party of course is in a different situation. It is entitled
to have the long party place it in the same economic position it would
have occupied had it advanced the long party an amount equal to the
market value of the referenced security. But there are at least two
salient distinctions, from the short party’s perspective, between a TRS
and a loan. First, the short party does not actually advance the
notional amount to the long party. Second, it is subject to the risk that
the referenced asset will appreciate during the term of the TRS. . . .
....
Institutions that hedge short TRS exposure by purchasing the
referenced shares typically have no economic interest in the securities.
They are, however, beneficial owners and thus have the right to vote
the referenced shares.
Institutional voting practices appear to vary. As noted below,
some take the position that they will not vote shares held to hedge TRS
risk. Some may be influenced, at least in some cases, to vote as a
counterparty desires. Some say they vote as they determine in their
sole discretion. Of course, one may suppose that banks seeking to
attract swap business well understand that activist investors will
consider them to be more attractive counterparties if they vote in favor
of the positions their clients advocate.
Id. at 520–21, 522 (footnotes omitted).
138
Id. at 522. The court described how swaps misalign voting rights:
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A shareholder is allowed to revoke or supersede a previously
submitted proxy at any time before the polls close.139 In a contested
election, especially a close one, beneficial owners commonly receive
repeated proxy solicitations; either through confusion or because of a
change of mind, some return voting instructions multiple times for the
same shares.140 When an overvote or obvious duplication of proxies
occurs, the tabulator or inspector of election should eliminate prior
proxies and count only the last one.141 Multiple proxies create confusion
that, if not resolved, can disqualify all of them.142
Adding to the confusion, brokers and banks commonly return
partial proxies that represent only some of the shares they are entitled to
vote, submitting them incrementally as they receive voting instructions
from their customers; because they represent the voting instructions of
many beneficial owners, these proxies typically include combinations of
For, Against, and Abstain votes.143 These proxies count cumulatively,
but may include repetitive votes, or may, because of share lending, total
more votes than the intermediary is entitled to vote.144 An intermediary
must reconcile any overvote with the tabulator by making adjustments
that remove votes from the final aggregated proxy—but the beneficial
[T]he accumulation of substantial hedge positions significantly alters the
corporate electorate. It does so by (1) eliminating the shares constituting
the hedge positions from the universe of available votes, (2) subjecting
the voting of the shares to the control or influence of a long party that
does not own the shares, or (3) leaving the vote to be determined by an
institution that has no economic interest in the fortunes of the issuer,
holds nothing more than a formal interest, but is aware that future
swap business from a particular client may depend upon voting in the
“right” way.
Id. (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
The court reviewed evidence that the hedge funds’ counterparties bought and sold
CSX shares immediately before and after record dates in a pattern clearly calculated to
secure dividend and voting rights Id. at 544. Although legal, these transactions
contributed to an overall impression of manipulative conduct. Cf. id.
139
Magill v. N. Am. Refractories Co., 128 A.2d 233, 237 (Del. 1956) (stockholder may
change his vote until the polls close).
140
Obara, supra note 33, at 10-14 to 10-15 (it is not unusual for five proxies to be returned
for a single position in a contested corporate election).
141
Id. at 10-16.
142
Williams v. Sterling Oil of Okla., Inc., 273 A.2d 264, 265 (Del. 1971) (“the inspectors of
an election must reject all identical but conflicting proxies when the conflict cannot be
resolved from the face of the proxies themselves or from the regular books and records of
the corporation”). Accord Concord Fin. Group, Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co. 567 A.2d
1, 15–16 (Del. Ch. 1989).
143
Obara, supra note 33, at 10-13. Where the total eligible vote is not exceeded, all such
proxies are counted. See also Schott v. Climax Molybdenum Co., 154 A.2d 221, 223 (Del. Ch.
1959) (stating same).
144
See supra notes 120–123 and accompanying text.
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owners will never know that some of their shares did not count, and if
double-counting is offset by an undervote, it may go unremarked.145
Although both the records at Cede & Co. and beneficial owners’
account statements purport to track a definite number of shares, and
although counting votes requires definite numbers of shares, the
underlying reality is that custodial accounts hold pro rata interests in a
fungible mass of shares—shares that are in continual motion, being
bought, sold, lent, and borrowed without being traceable to particular
accounts.146 Reconciling vote counts to pro rata shares of a fungible mass
is pointless, and nobody really tries.147 Because the net settlement
system creates intraday discrepancies between a broker’s total holding at
DTC and the sum of shares in its internal accounts, brokers have to
adjust the number of shares their customers vote, in order to reconcile
the total vote to whatever number of shares DTC held for the broker at
the instant selected as the record date for the meeting.148
Finally, ignoring the complex reality of voting, by law inspectors of
election may examine only the legal proxy documents, as if they
represented shareholders’ actual votes rather than votes that one or more
intermediaries have aggregated and adjusted.149
Delaware law
consistently considers inspectors’ powers and duties “purely ministerial,
not quasi-judicial,” and emphasizes the value of an expeditious result
over its accuracy.150
These factors evidence a voting system and a process that is
susceptible to both accidental and intentional miscounting of
shareholders’ votes.

145
SEC, supra note 88 (in principle intermediaries are obliged to vote as instructed, but
their diligence in doing so cannot be monitored). See supra note 127 (stating same). If a
broker or bank fails to reconcile an overvote or conflicting proxies, the inspector of election
may disqualify some or all of the associated proxies, in effect disenfranchising multiple
beneficial owners whose voting instructions were aggregated by the broker or bank. See
supra note 125 and accompanying text.
146
See supra text accompanying notes 93–94.
147
See supra note 94.
148
See supra text accompanying notes 93–94, 121.
149
Cf. DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 231(d) (2009). Inspectors may use only information on the face of
the proxy or the envelope and must accept anything that reasonably purports to be a valid
proxy; they may not consider extrinsic evidence as to a proxy’s authority except to resolve
broker overvotes. Id.
150
Williams v. Sterling Oil, 273 A.2d at 265 (describing duties of inspectors); DEL. CODE tit.
8 § 225(a) (2009) (judicial inquiry into proxies and voting is reserved to the chancery court,
upon suit by a shareholder with standing); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651,
668 (Del. Ch. 1988) (inspectors’ duties are conditioned by administrative need for
expedition and certainty).
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F. Direct Communication, Direct Registration
In 2004, the Business Roundtable, in collaboration with Georgeson
Shareholder Services, proposed changes to SEC rules, made possible by
exploiting available technology that would alleviate problems in the
current system of proxy communication.151 The proposed changes
would enable proxy information and voting rights to move directly from
issuers to beneficial owners, rather than “cascading down through
successive layers of custodians” as is currently required for shares held
“in street name.”152
Benefits to investors would include vote
confirmation, an audit trail on votes cast, and eliminating the practice of
brokers voting shares that they do not own; in addition, reducing
complexity would eliminate some unnecessary costs.153
An enabling infrastructure for eliminating (not merely immobilizing)
paper stock certificates already exists and could be used to avoid the
complexities of custodial relationships: the Direct Registration System
151
See Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 3, 10 (proposing changes to SEC rules);
Georgeson Shareholder Communications, Inc., Re: Rule No. 4-493, Letter to SEC, 1–4 (May
3, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/4-493/georgeson050304.pdf (supporting the
Business Roundtable’s request for rule changes). The proposal by the Business Roundtable
and Georgeson related to a then-pending SEC rule change that would have enhanced
shareholders’ access to the corporate proxy process. SEC Release No. 34-48628, 68 Fed.
Reg. 60784, 2003 WL 22350515 (Oct. 14, 2003). This Rule 14a-11, not adopted then but
newly re-proposed, would, under certain circumstances, require publicly traded companies
to include shareholder nominees for director in the companies’ proxy materials unless state
law or a company’s governing documents prohibit shareholders from nominating
directors. SEC Release Nos. 33-9046, 34-60089 (June 10, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/2009/33-9046.pdf. In a related development, Delaware revised its General
Corporate Law, effective August 1, 2009, empowering Delaware corporations to limit
through bylaws shareholders’ ability to nominate director candidates, reimbursement of
proxy expenses, etc. DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 112 (2009).
See also Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc., 2008 Proxy Season Key Statistics,
http://www.broadridge.com/investor-communications/us/2008ProxyStats.pdf (over 79%
of shares voted in the 2008 proxy season were voted via the internet-based ProxyEdge®
service, which attests to investors’ ability and willingness to use electronic infrastructure in
communications and transactions related to their shareholdings).
152
Georgeson, supra note 151, at 1; Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 12.
153
Georgeson, supra note 151, at 3. Vote confirmation would provide a safeguard against
mistakes and fraud, and would allow fiduciaries to document how they have voted shares
held in trust. Id. Audit trails would enable sorting out complexities of voting stock that
has been loaned, and are essential if voting results are challenged legally. Id. The
justification for broker discretionary voting—companies need it to avoid failed quorums
even though it is patently anti-democratic—would vanish with effective direct
communication to shareholders. Id. Benefits to issuers include reduction in the cost and
time that proxy communication requires, and transparency as to who the shareholders are
(although it eliminates the OBO/NOBO mechanism, the proposal allows for beneficial
owners who require privacy to arrange nominee ownership at their own expense.) Id. at 3–
4.
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(“DRS”), operated by DTC, allows beneficial owners to register their
shares electronically on the books of an issuer or its transfer agent, and to
transfer them using DRS transactions.154 Registration of the shares
assures direct communication between issuers and beneficial owners,
and eliminates broker voting as well as the need for “fungible mass”
accounting of shareholdings that leads to errors, discrepancies, and
adjustments to voting instructions.155 However, for investors who trade
frequently, or if prompt execution of trades is important, holding shares
in DRS is less advantageous than holding “in street name”; brokers’
internal systems better meet their needs.156 DRS has been available since
1996; all states’ laws now allow corporations to issue shares without
paper certificates, and all U.S. stock exchanges require issuers to be
capable of participating in the DRS; yet, despite the opportunity DRS
offers to reduce complexity and errors, it is little used.157
154
See SEC, Holding Your Securities—Get the Facts, http://www.sec.gov/investor/
pubs/holdsec.htm; Securities Industry & Financial Markets Assn., Direct Registration System
Educational Webinar, June 24, 2008, http://events.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Events/2008/
DRSwebinar/DRSEdWebinar6-24-08.pdf (“DRS webinar”). See also Joseph Trezza, Going
Paperless in the Securities Industry: Benefitting Issuers and Investors, CORP. SEC. &
GOVERNANCE PROFESSIONAL 2–3 (newsletter, June 2007) (U.S. markets are catching up;
dozens of countries’ securities markets have eliminated paper certificates over the last
twenty years). Even with the vast majority of share certificates now immobilized, the
current volume of issuance and transfer of certificates costs the industry about $350 million
annually, including $50 million to replace lost or stolen certificates; certificates worth $16
billion were lost in the 9/11 World Trade Center disaster and had to be replaced at a cost of
$300 million, whereas electronic records were preserved. Id. at 3–4. Securities Indus. & Fin.
Markets Ass’n [SIFMA], Securities Industry Immobilization & Dematerialization Implementation
Guide 18–22 (2008), www.sifma.org/services/techops/pdf/SIFMA-DematerializationGuide.pdf-2008-10-27 (summarizing the costs of processing certificates and the benefits of
DRS).
155
See supra Part II.D.2 (indicating why DTC, owned by member firms in the securities
industry, is unlikely ever to develop functionality in DRS that would compete effectively
with brokerage firms’ street-name shareholding arrangements); see also SIFMA,
Dematerialization Guide, supra note 154, at 32 (noting that brokerage firms prefer their clients
to hold shares in street name).
156
SEC, supra note 154. Trading requires that shares first be transferred and re-registered
to a broker, then traded; even though it is accomplished electronically, in a fast-moving
market the time required by this extra step could have significant financial impact. Id.
Although issuers can buy and sell shares held in DRS, timing and price of transactions is
entirely outside the investor’s control. Id.
157
SEC Release No. 37931, Order Granting Approval to Establish DRS (Nov. 7, 1996),
[File No. SR-DTC-96-15] (approving establishment of DRS to provide cost-efficient
transfers, prompt settlement of trades, and reduction in problems related to lost or stolen
certificates); SEC Release No. 34-54289, Order Granting Approval to Mandate Listed
Companies Become Eligible to Participate in DRS (Aug. 8, 2006), 71 Fed. Reg. 47278 (Aug.
16, 2006) [File No. SR-NYSE-2006-29] (setting DRS implementation deadlines for issuers
and exchanges, including final deadline for all listed stocks to achieve DRC compatibility
by Jan. 2008, later extended to Mar. 2008). See also SIFMA, DRS webinar, supra note 154
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This Part reviewed the increasing incidence of contested corporate
elections and the legal rules that govern the conduct of those elections—
rules based on presumptions about shareholding that clash in part with
present-day realities. Complex arrangements arose to relate actual share
ownership and trading practices to legal presumptions and to enhance
the efficiency and liquidity of securities markets, but the multiplicity of
players and handoffs of information increased susceptibility to errors
when law requires a shareholder vote. Corporate directors have
fiduciary duties to shareholders, but in relation to elections, those duties
are enforced only by exception, to sanction blatant manipulation of the
election process.
III. ANALYSIS
Delaware law presumes a form of corporate election that once was
common but today is obsolete for all but the smallest corporations: an
election with registered shareholders, simple proxy arrangements, inperson attendance at the annual meeting, and an ability for shareholders
to hold directors accountable.158 If the law’s presumption matched
reality, counting the vote fairly and accurately would be simple;
however, because most shares are today held “in street name” (which is
essential to the efficiency and liquidity of today’s securities markets), the
mechanisms provided under Delaware law are not conducive to an
accurate vote count.159
Part III.A focuses on the reasons why accurately counting
shareholders’ votes matters. Part III.B reviews how the street-name
holding system’s complexity opens it to errors in counting the vote. Part
III.C reviews how technical solutions could reduce errors. Part III.D
focuses on the governance issues that determine confidence in corporate
(detailing progress in dematerialization, cost savings, and the securities industry’s further
goals for DRS).
158
Greenwood, supra note 54; Dallas, supra note 28.
159
Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1248–49.
The complexity of the custodial ownership system, combined with the
pressure of numerous shareholder votes, creates a system that is far
more complex and fragile than the one anticipated by the Delaware
legal structure. There are somewhere around 17,000 reporting
companies. Most of these companies are subject to the SEC proxy rules
when they solicit proxies. Finally, annual meetings are seasonal, with
most taking place during the second quarter of the calendar year.
Broadridge delivers more than one billion communications to
investors per year. It is an accident waiting to happen.
Id. [footnotes omitted]. See also Prefatory Note to UCC § 8-101 (summarizing concisely
differences between current reality and the shareholding and trading environment
presumed by corporation law).
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enterprises and the extent to which the courts have found any
enforceable duty to count the vote accurately in corporate elections.
A.

The Importance of the Shareholder Franchise

In Blasius, Chancellor Allen stated that the shareholder franchise “is
critical to the theory that legitimates the exercise of power by some
(directors and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they do
not own”160 and that “the prospect of losing a validly conducted
shareholder vote cannot . . . constitute a legitimate threat to a corporate
interest, at least if one accepts the traditional model of the nature of the
corporation that sees shareholders as ‘owners.’”161 Specifically, the
shareholder franchise is crucial to a balance of power between the board
of directors and shareholders.162 In theory, shareholders’ economic
interest as owners (or as residual claimants on the corporation’s earnings
and assets) assures that this allocation of governance power is
appropriately placed, but this alignment is by no means assured.163

160
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988); Allen et al., supra
note 15, at 1311 (“[T]he shareholders’ right to elect the corporation’s governing body is a
fundamental, cardinal foundation of Delaware corporation law.”).
161
Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.25 1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990) (board’s deferral of
annual meeting in response to shareholder’s intent to conduct a proxy contest was
reasonable to allow time for informing shareholders of issues). The traditional view is that
the law permits directors’ independence solely for the benefit of the true owners,
shareholders, and limits directors’ autonomy by fiduciary duties, requirements that
shareholders approve some decisions, and the right of shareholders to elect the directors.
Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 442
(2006). In contrast, the contractarian view is that the law assigns legitimating governance
power to shareholders (among all interested constituencies) because as the residual
claimant the shareholder has most at risk and thus has the strongest interest in assuring
that directors will perform to maximize the wealth of all constituencies. Id. at 446–47.
162
See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2002) (discussing a
proper balance in the allocation of power between the stockholders’ right to elect directors
and the board of directors’ right to manage the corporation); Allen et al., supra note 15, at
1311 (“When directors intentionally act to thwart the right of the shareholders to remove
them at the polls, they intrude upon basic statutory rights of the shareholders and upset the
careful balance of power created by the Delaware General Corporation Law.”). Some
commentators view the shareholder franchise as a mechanism for correcting errors. See
supra note 14.
163
Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1380–81 (Del. 1995) (“[S]tockholders are
presumed to act in their own best economic interests when they vote in a proxy contest.”).
However, short selling, vote-buying, and derivative instruments and broker discretionary
voting allow parties to vote shares without economic interest. See supra notes 136–38 and
accompanying text; supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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B. The Current System Produces Errors
Even though tabulation errors in corporate elections only rarely
become the object of litigation, it is indisputable that the existing proxy
system is error-prone—its complexity, the need for behind-the-scenes
adjustment of the vote, and lack of verification assure a significant
incidence of errors, and they create opportunities for abuse.164
A number of key reasons follow:
▪ Complex
custodial
relationships
require
multi-layer
communication of proxy information and voting instructions.165
▪ The collection and aggregation of voting instructions proceeds
with no verification or audit trail, and is subject to adjustment in
any case; unconstrained by law, custodians’ policies and
practices differ.166
▪ Over- and under-voting produce discrepancies that sometimes
need to be resolved and sometimes mask disproportionate
allocation of voting power.167
▪ Because net settlement of transactions produces transient
discrepancies in share counts, custodians assign and adjust votes
(at least in part arbitrarily because verifiable facts are
unavailable), and sometimes vote without instructions, to make
the total vote count conform to the record total of shares they
hold on behalf of various beneficial owners.168
▪ Although common law obligates custodians to follow beneficial
owners’ voting instructions, the inability to verify execution of
voting instructions renders enforcement of fiduciary duty mostly
infeasible.169
▪ Legal vote-buying arrangements, derivative instruments, and
short selling separate voting rights from economic interest and
obscure who has voting rights.170
▪ Rules for inspectors of election favor expeditious determination
of the result over accuracy; but in close elections accuracy is
crucial to the outcome.171
164
See supra notes 2–13 and accompanying text. See also Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at
1249 (cataloguing three categories of voting “pathologies”—caused by complexity of the
system, by confusions about ownership of shares, and by misalignment between voting
rights and economic interests).
165
Supra Part II.D.
166
Supra note 119 and accompanying text.
167
Supra notes 120–23, 139–42 and accompanying text.
168
Supra notes 90, 122–23 and accompanying text.
169
Supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
170
Supra notes 132–38 and accompanying text.
171
Supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/5

Barrett: Elephant in the Boardroom?: Counting the Vote in Corporate Elect

2009]

Elephant in the Boardroom?

169

The vote count that tabulators and inspectors report in corporate
elections is the sum of pro rata shares of multiple fungible masses held by
custodians, arbitrarily adjusted by the custodians, who may untraceably
add or subtract votes to fill any gaps. In a close contest, could a
reasonable person have confidence that such a tally accurately represents
shareholders’ intent? Delaware law does. Rather than assuring a fair
and accurate election process, it seems the law disregards manifest flaws
in the corporate voting process—tolerating systematic bias and gross
miscounts as mere errors, regrettable but insignificant.
The dearth of case law concerning accuracy in counting the vote in
corporate elections may relate to the presumption, noted above, that
counting is a simple matter.172 Although errors in counting votes
sometimes have figured in litigation, Delaware courts’ decisions have yet
to define how or whether directors’ (or proxyholders’) fiduciary duties
apply to obtaining an accurate vote count; although it is possible to glean
or infer some principles from dicta, cases have been decided on other
issues.173
It is fair to ask: how much accuracy is it reasonable to expect in
elections conducted largely through proxies? No definitive answer is
possible, but it is germane to observe that modern corporations have
many millions of shares outstanding, often held by shareholders large
and small, in widely scattered accounts. As in a civil election, every vote
should count, but achieving perfect accuracy is neither feasible nor
affordable.174
Delaware courts explicitly recognize the need for
expeditious conclusion of elections and finality of results, and weigh
172
Supra note 158. But cf. In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 374–79 (Del.
Ch. 2008) (plaintiff’s claim that incorrect tabulation of votes meant shareholders had not
validly approved a merger withstood defendants’ motion for summary judgment).
173
E.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663–67 (Del. Ch. 1988) (reciting
problems counting consents and revocations, the court found inspectors made errors in
counting, and concluded that both sides in the contest nevertheless must accept as final the
totals the inspectors had announced); In re Transkaryotic, 954 A.2d at 355–56 (discussing
problems in eliminating possible duplicate proxies, finding a question of material fact
sufficient to defeat summary judgment motion).
174
In a criminal prosecution of tampering with a union election, the court commented:
In any election, public or private, involving more than a minimal
number of voters or ballots, a rule requiring the government to prove
that an alternative outcome would have ensued had the election been
untainted would render the victors’ offices and emoluments virtually
invulnerable . . . There are simply too many variables, and it would
give the defendants the benefit of too many unknowns that are truly
unknowables. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt has never required
proof to a mathematical certainty.
United States v. DeFries, 909 F. Supp. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 129 F.3d
1293 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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these goals against protection of the franchise—redounding usually to
the advantage of incumbent directors and management.175 Even
allowing that some margin of error is unavoidable in practice, a system
that can produce a miscount amounting to 20% of the total vote—as in
the 2008 Yahoo annual meeting—intuitively is not sufficiently
accurate.176 And the view articulated in In re Transkaryotic, that a court
can by definition offer no remedy once an irreparable harm has occurred,
leaves shareholders without either equitable or legal relief.177
C. Technology Could Help—a Little
Technology-enabled changes to the proxy voting process, along the
lines proposed in 2004 by the Business Roundtable and Georgeson
Shareholder Communications, could improve accuracy and streamline
the process.178
Transparency of ownership would open direct communication
between issuers and beneficial owners, enabling issuers to better
understand who the owners are.179 Direct communication would
eliminate most of the handoffs in proxy dissemination and voting,
reducing delays.180 Every handoff eliminated removes an opportunity to
lose or distort information; the proposed change would significantly
reduce errors.181 Reducing or eliminating handoffs that now occur
between the beneficial owner and the inspector of election would enable
confirmation of votes as well as direct validation of proxies, providing a
safeguard against mistakes and fraud.182
By eliminating intermediaries’ aggregation and adjustment steps, the
process of reconciling multiple proxies from the same beneficial owner
Supra note 150 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Concord Fin. Group, Inc. v. Tri-State
Motor Transit Co. 567 A.2d 1, 6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 1989) (policy against shareholder
disenfranchisement is counterbalanced by need for finality in corporate elections). But cf.
Allison v. Preston, 651 A.2d 772, 777 (Del. Ch. 1994) (upholding the policy against
disenfranchising beneficial owners, for the benefit of incumbent directors whom election
had ousted, by reversing election inspectors’ routine proxy-counting decisions because
obligatory rather than voluntary nominee ownership of pension fund’s shares, required by
ERISA, meant beneficial owners did not accept risk of agent’s misfeasance ordinarily
associated with nominee ownership).
176
See supra note 25 (describing expectations surrounding a democratic vote).
177
954 A.2d at 361 (Del. Ch. 2008) (granting summary judgment to defendant directors
where plaintiffs alleged disclosure violations tainted the vote that narrowly approved a
merger).
178
Supra Part II.F.
179
Georgeson, supra note 151, at 2; Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 7–9, 12.
180
Georgeson, supra note 151, at 1–2; Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 9.
181
Georgeson, supra note 151, at 3; Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 12; Donald, supra
note 85, at 33.
182
Georgeson, supra note 151, at 3; Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 12.
175
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(both partial proxies and proxies revoking earlier ones) would be simple,
traceable, and verifiable—rather than being untraceable after being
aggregated with others; voting would be auditable, although some
adjustment to discrepancies in the fungible mass might still be
required.183
Discontinuation of discretionary broker voting, which the Business
Round Table and Georgeson recommended and which soon will be in
effect, means the vote count will better reflect the true wishes of voting
shareholders who have a genuine economic interest.184 The changes
proposed by the Business Round Table and Georgeson would reduce
overall system cost by allowing elimination of some back-office work at
many intermediaries.185 The changes also would allocate the cost burden
of OBO confidentiality to those investors who desire and benefit from
it.186 The further step of linking beneficial owners’ accounts to DRS
(which might be accepted if implemented with powers of attorney for
brokers) would simplify custodial relationships, but would remove share
lending as a revenue source for brokerages.187
Certain significant obstacles would need to be overcome. Various
parties—brokers, Broadridge, and others—collect fees for performing the
services that make the current complex system work, and stand to lose
significant revenue.188 Because custodians have no incentive to give up
their control over account information or proxy voting, but exercise
significant influence over rules set by self-regulating organizations like
DTC and stock exchanges, there is little prospect of change to the status
quo ante.189 Finally, although applying technology could alleviate errors,
could reduce opportunities to manipulate the vote, and could improve
efficiency, it has no bearing on whether anyone has legal accountability
for accurately counting the vote.
D. Suspect Motives and Biased Procedures
Plainly, in any contested election or change-of-control decision, and
sometimes even in uncontested director elections, the board is an
interested party for whom the temptation to exploit any advantage is

183
184

Georgeson, supra note 151, at 3.
Georgeson, supra note 151, at 3; Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 7; SEC, supra note

101.
185
186
187
188
189

Georgeson, supra note 151, at 2.
Id.
Supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
Donald, supra note 86, at 63–64.
Supra text accompanying note 128; note 155.
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present.190 Regardless of whether we believe the shareholder franchise
legitimates the separation of control from ownership, or merely
acknowledge that statutes call for shareholders to vote, it is an
unfortunate practical necessity that an interested party, the board of
directors, conducts the process by which shareholders exercise their
voting powers.191
Courts have nullified or formally rescinded legal board action when
it was taken for an inequitable purpose.192 If board action effectively
thwarts shareholders’ right to vote, a court can apply Blasius scrutiny—
but the plaintiff must first prove the board’s primary purpose was to
impede the vote, a difficult burden that plaintiffs seldom can
overcome.193
The courts set aside elections if overt intentional
manipulation of election machinery is proven, but seldom have they
held an individual accountable for having a role in such manipulation.194

190
Supra note 26. Short of purposeful manipulation of the vote, a contested election or
change-of-control transaction allows directors’ motives to be questioned but does not
invoke conflict-of-interest treatment as in cases involving usurpation of corporate
opportunity or freeze-out mergers.
191
See supra note 84; see also Velasco, supra note 27, at 659 (arguing that courts should
respect the balance of power established in corporate law and disallow protection of the
business judgment rule if board action impinges on shareholders’ rights). Although DEL.
CODE tit. 8 § 141(a) (2009) authorizes the board of directors to manage the corporation’s
business and affairs, the routine conduct of business affairs does not encompass the
election of directors or fundamental decisions concerning disposition of shareholders’
property; it seems incongruous that the board of directors, having a potential conflict of
interest in such matters, should enjoy control over the voting mechanism.
192
Lerman, 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980) (inequitable conduct does not require an evil or
selfish motive).
193
See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text on the Blasius standard and its relation to
Unocal analysis. See also Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982) (willful
perpetuation of a shareholder deadlock, resulting in board’s entrenchment, frustrated a
50% shareholder’s voting rights and justified court’s appointment of a custodian); accord
MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003) (board that enlarged its
membership to impede proxy fight for control was held to Blasius standard of compelling
justification); Velasco, supra note 27, at 617 (noting the superficiality of the Unocal test in
practice—nearly anything counts as a threat and nearly any response, if not preclusive or
coercive of the vote, is deemed reasonable).
194
See supra notes 71–72; see also Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996) (shareholder
vote may be invalidated if wrongfully coerced, i.e., if shareholders were led to vote on
some basis other than the merits of the transaction); Linton v. Everett, No. Civ. A. 15219,
1997 WL 441189 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997) (setting aside election where directors issued new
shares to themselves and effectively precluded opportunity for nomination of an
alternative slate of board candidates). But cf. Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43
(Del. Ch. 2008) (holding incumbent board’s secret vote-buying arrangement and
manipulative conduct of annual meeting were inequitable conduct, the court set aside
corporate election and ordered a new election with expense to be borne by defendant
incumbents). The newly-enacted amendment to § 225 grants the Court of Chancery power
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Sometimes the courts shield management from the limited statutory
power of shareholders in ways that seem to “upset the careful balance of
power.”195 Arguably, the fact that the law allocates to shareholders the
power to vote on certain questions entails shareholders’ legal right to
expect an accurate count of the vote, a right that should be enforceable
on those who are entrusted with conducting the election and counting
the vote.196 In In re MONY Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, Vice
Chancellor Lamb noted that in the context of elections, directors’ duties
are largely ministerial, and in Malone v. Brincat, the Delaware Supreme
Court emphasized that directors’ fiduciary duties include the duty to
deal with shareholders honestly, not only in required disclosures but in
all things—which presumably includes all aspects of conducting a
corporate election.197
Even when a court enforces shareholders’
unimpeded right to vote effectively, the decision means little without an
assurance that shareholders’ votes will be counted accurately: without
an accurate count, the vote is not effective.198
to remove directors to avoid irreparable harm (but only after a felony conviction or breachof-loyalty judgment related to directorial misconduct). 77 Del. Laws ch. 14 § 10 (2009).
195
Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1311. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (upholding board’s action when, facing threat of a hostile tender
offer, it restructured a pending merger as an acquisition to obviate need for shareholders’
approval); Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) (the court found
substantive coercion, essentially shareholders’ inability to recognize or understand their
true economic interest, a sufficient reason to justify denying a vote to shareholders). A
striking recent example is the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision to allow a New York
court to rule on a question of Delaware law in In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig.,
No. Civ. A. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 959992 (Del.Ch. Apr. 9, 2008) (allowing a merger to
proceed where issuance of new stock to the acquirer transparently eliminated shareholders’
statutory right to an uncoerced vote on the merger); see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How
to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of
Comity, 58 Emory L. J. 713 (2009) (arguing that allowing a New York court to decide left
Delaware case law undisturbed and avoided a “showdown” with powerful federal
government officials who had brokered the deal).
196
See supra note 25 (discussing the expectation of an accurate vote count in any
democratic process).
197
In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 675 (Del. Ch. 2004); Malone v.
Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); supra note 38 and accompanying text. In Malone the
court reasoned that “directors have definitive guidance in discharging their fiduciary duty
[of disclosure] by an analysis of the factual circumstances relating to the specific
shareholder action being requested and an inquiry into the potential for deception or
misinformation.” Id. at 12. By similar reasoning, if fiduciary duties extend to fairness in
the manner of conducting an election, directors could obtain definitive guidance by
analyzing circumstances relating to the proxy-handling and voting process and inquiry
into the potential for bias or error in counting the votes.
198
MM Cos., 813 A.2d at 1127 (Del. 2003); SEC, Unofficial Transcript of Roundtable on
Proxy Voting Mechanics 3 (May 24, 2007)), http://www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings/
2007/openmtg_trans052407.pdf (in opening remarks, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
stated that voting is of little value if the vote is not counted accurately).
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In a quantitative empirical study of corporate elections, Professor
Yair Listokin found that proposals sponsored by management are
“overwhelmingly more likely to win . . . by a very small amount than to
lose by a very small amount—to a degree that cannot occur by
chance.”199 This pattern apparently results because management, using
the significant advantage conferred by real-time information from
Broadridge and its control over when to close the polls, is able to engage
in last-minute proxy campaigning just sufficient to obtain the outcome it
wants.200
This Note detailed the many ways in which customary practice and
the law confer significant advantages to a corporation’s incumbent board
of directors in any contest, and how meager are the means available to
shareholders to assert or defend their statutory governance rights.201
Because the frailties and design of the proxy communication and voting
process tend to favor incumbent boards over other interests, built-in bias
may impair the legitimacy of an election even in the absence of overt
manipulation by the board.202 As Chancellor Allen observed in a
different situation of built-in bias, “it is hard to imagine that a valid
corporate purpose is served by perpetuating a structure that removes
from the public shareholders the practical power to elect directors other
than those supported by management.”203
Ought the courts enforce a stricter standard of fiduciary duty when
the integrity of the voting process is at stake, including the not-assimple-as-it-seems counting of the vote? By judicial interpretation, the
duty of care pertains to diligence in making business decisions and so is
not germane to assuring integrity of the vote.204 The duty of loyalty is
implicated only in overt self-dealing for pecuniary gain, and would not
apply to conducting an election.205 Among the three primary fiduciary
duties, the partly-defined duty of good faith remains as the only likely
means of protecting the voting process.206 According to Professor
Stone’s view of the context-dependency of the duty of good faith:

Listokin, supra note 37, at 4.
Id. at 25–26, 29. For examples of such manipulation, see supra notes 36–37 and
accompanying text.
201
Supra Parts II.A, II.C.
202
Supra Part III.B.
203
Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001, 1012 (Del. Ch. 1987) (denying motion for judgment on
the pleadings where plaintiff director sought to vote shares, held by a subsidiary, sufficient
to control the parent corporation).
204
Supra Part II.C.1.
205
Supra Part II.C.2.
206
Supra Part II.C.5.
199
200
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[T]he board subverts the purpose of its coordinating
power if it uses that power to determine the outcome of
decisions allocated to collective shareholder action. The
board holds that power to facilitate decisions that
express the shareholders’ preferences, not to manipulate
the voting to achieve predetermined results. Actions
taken for the purpose of manipulating the outcome of a
collective shareholder action are, in this context, taken in
bad faith.207
In Delaware jurisprudence, a failure in the duty of good faith
removes protection of the business judgment rule and other exculpatory
provisions, exposing directors to potential liability.208 What is needed to
protect the integrity of elections is an affirmative duty that—like the
duty of disclosure—is triggered when a board requests shareholder
action and has responsibility to administer the process by which
shareholders’ rights are exercised.
In some cases courts have focused attention on the effectiveness of the
shareholder vote rather than inquire into the board’s subjective purpose,
subjecting even board inaction to judicial scrutiny.209 An effectiveness
standard—a duty to assure that election mechanisms allow shareholders’
votes to have full effect—would comport well with the statutory
reservation of certain decisions to shareholders’ vote and the view that
directors have a duty to deal honestly and with scrupulous fairness
toward shareholders.210 If a court may nullify an otherwise valid vote
because an overt purposeful action caused shareholders to vote in a
certain way for reasons other than the merits of the issue, the court
presumably may equally nullify a vote if something in the voting process
207
Stone, supra note 54, at 926. Cf. Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (“[M]atters involving the integrity of the shareholder voting process involve
consideration not present in any other context in which directors exercise delegated
power.”).
208
See supra notes 76–78.
209
See Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980) (court held invalid a
bylaw, otherwise lawful, that prevented a shareholder from waging a proxy contest);
Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982) (willful perpetuation of a
shareholder deadlock, resulting in board’s entrenchment, frustrated a 50% shareholder’s
voting rights and justified court’s appointment of a custodian); Hubbard v. Hollywood
Park Realty Enters., Inc., No. Civ. A. 11779, 1991 WL 3151 (Del. Ch., Jan. 14, 1991),(when an
advance-notice bylaw kept a competing slate of director candidates off the election ballot,
court ordered waiver of the bylaw, applying Schnell and Lerman rather than Blasius; the
court equated inaction with action in the circumstances and commented “occasions do
arise where board inaction, even where not inequitable in purpose or design, may
nonetheless operate inequitably”). Id. at *10. See also supra note 42.
210
Supra Part III.A.
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has the effect of causing votes to be counted other than the way
shareholders actually voted on the merits of the issue.211 In this context,
where directors’ contextually-defined role is (in contradistinction to
making business decisions) solely to effectuate shareholders’ governance
rights, their passive acquiescence in an inequitable effect or result cannot
properly fulfill an affirmative fiduciary duty.212 In conducting the
election, it matters not at all what (disputable) vision the directors have
of the corporation’s best interest: the right to decide belongs to
shareholders. And so it is reasonable to argue that if corporate directors
fail to mitigate known faults in the election process—faults that
foreseeably may, and sometimes do, produce an inaccurate and possibly
inequitable result—a court could find they consciously disregard a
known responsibility, they fail to act in the face of a known duty to act;
that is, they breach their duty of good faith.213
IV. CONTRIBUTION
This Part proposes an Effective Voting Rule—complementary to the
business judgment rule—that would protect shareholders’ statutory
power to make informed decisions in specified circumstances. Like
disclosure duties, the Effective Voting Rule would apply any time a
board requests shareholder action.
First, this Part reviews the rationale and legislative intent of the
corporate governance scheme embodied in Delaware’s General
Corporation Law, concluding that stronger protection for the powers
allocated to shareholders would enhance legitimacy without weakening
directors’ allocated powers. Second, it describes the force of the Effective
Voting Rule, the conditions that trigger its application, and its
consistency with other rules of law. Third, it projects how the rule
would stimulate development and implementation of methods for
handling and counting proxies that would improve accuracy and
perceived legitimacy of corporate elections. Fourth, it addresses
Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d at 1382–83. See supra note 42, discussing decisions in
which the court intervened to nullify boards’ actions taken without specific manipulative
intent or to enjoin board action where inaction produced an inequitable result.
212
Hubbard, 1991 WL 3151. See also supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text on the
purpose of a board’s coordinating powers.
213
See supra notes 76–77. Following Linton, scienter need not be proved. Linton v.
Everett, No. Civ. A. 15219, 1997 WL 441189, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997). Contra Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 1998) (holding that aspirational ideals of corporate
governance are not required by law). This principle is recognized in New York law: “[A
director] shall not be considered to be acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning
the matter in question that would cause . . . reliance [on officers, employees, outside
experts, or board committees] to be unwarranted.” N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717(a)(3) (2003).
211
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corollary matters that would require attention to optimize potential
benefits from the Effective Voting Rule.
Delaware’s General Corporation Law reserves routine business
decision-making exclusively to the board of directors, but reserves to
shareholders collectively the power to elect directors and approve
fundamental changes.214 The evident legislative (or contractual) intent of
this implied bargain, in which shareholders’ power to elect or remove
directors legitimates the directors’ control over corporate resources, is
that directors and shareholders should each exercise their respective
powers without interference.215
Case precedent promises to
shareholders the “unimpeded right to vote effectively”; this right
demands more comprehensive protection than merely sanctioning
actions taken with the “primary purpose” to thwart the vote (with the
burden placed on aggrieved shareholders to prove directors’
subjective—and primary—intent).216 Just as the business judgment rule
protects directors’ and managers’ autonomy in exercising their allocated
powers, a complementary legal doctrine should protect the power
allocated to shareholders. Then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs observed in
Hubbard that “[t]o allow for voting while maintaining a closed candidate
selection process . . . renders the former an empty exercise”;217 if so, then
surely it is likewise an empty exercise to allow for voting while
maintaining a demonstrably unreliable vote-counting process.
Born of practical necessity, boards play a ministerial role when
shareholders exercise their powers.218 To protect shareholders’ allocated
powers, a proposed Effective Voting Rule would impose on directors an
affirmative duty, when conducting a corporate election, to ensure the

Supra section II.A.
See supra section II.A. The statutes that allocate powers to shareholders and to
directors presumably are of equal dignity and independent legal significance.
216
Velasco, supra note 27, advocates applying Blasius scrutiny to any intent, not only a
primary purpose, to interfere with voting rights. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564
A.2d 651, 652 (Del. Ch. 1988) (board action having “primary purpose” to impede
shareholders’ action breached fiduciary duty); MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d
1118, 1127 (Del. 2003) (“unimpeded right to vote effectively”). As noted supra note 81,
enforcement of the disclosure duty under SEC Rule 14a-9, forbidding false or misleading
information in proxy statements issued in anticipation of shareholder voting, does not
require proof of knowledge or intent.
217
Hubbard, 1991 WL 3151, at *6.
218
The duty of arranging for and conducting meetings of shareholders is assigned to
boards not because this function benefits from directors’ discretionary judgment about the
best interests of the corporation but because collective shareholder action cannot occur
without coordination and nobody else is positioned to provide it. To apply the business
judgment rule in these circumstances invites the board to intrude on shareholders’ powers
with a promise of impunity. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
214
215
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unimpaired effectiveness of shareholders’ voting power.219 Effective
voting is defined as voting that is (1) informed by appropriate disclosure
of material information, (2) fair in providing a reasonable opportunity for
competing candidates or proposals to be considered, and (3) accurate in
tabulating votes rightfully cast by beneficial owners. Like the disclosure
duty, the proposed Effective Voting Rule applies any time a board
requests shareholder action. It obligates directors to arrange all
procedures that are material to effective shareholder action with honesty
and scrupulous fairness; because proxy tabulation procedures can
determine the outcome of a close contest, their materiality is beyond
dispute. The rule supplements the board’s duty to disclose all available
material information and partakes of the same rationale: that statutory
shareholder action should be an informed decision—that is, both informed
and a decision.220 Grounded in the duty of good faith—action or inaction
that impairs the fairness and accuracy of the vote count would
demonstrate conscious disregard of a board’s responsibilities—the
Effective Voting Rule removes from ministerial acts in conducting an
election the protection of the business judgment rule and any
exculpatory bylaw under section 102(b)(7).221 Depending on factual
circumstances, remedies could include injunctive relief or monetary
damages.
The Effective Voting Rule doctrine would in no way diminish a
board’s ability (or duty) to inform or persuade shareholders in
anticipation of the vote, but it would require due care and good faith in
providing for a fair and accurate voting process—which shareholders
cannot provide for themselves and which the board oversees as a
ministerial duty.
The Effective Voting Rule significantly strengthens protection of
shareholders’ statutory powers, but is consistent with key decisions in
219
The Delaware Supreme Court promised in 1982 that “careful judicial scrutiny will be
given a situation in which the right to vote for the election of successor directors has been
effectively frustrated and denied[.]” Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del.
1982); see also Stone, supra note 54 at 924. The board needs flexibility for making business
decisions, but conducting corporate elections is not part of business decision-making. In
this context, strict enforcement of fiduciary duty is consistent with statutes that prevent
abuse (for instance, strict rules regulating the frequency of calling annual meetings,
determining eligibility to vote, and the timing and content of required disclosures). Id. at
919.
220
See supra section II.C.6 on the duty of disclosure.
221
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (if directors act not in good faith,
protections of an exculpatory charter provision do not attach); see DEL. CODE tit. 8
§ 102(b)(7) (2009) (allowing charter provisions exculpating directors for duty-of-care
liability); see also id. § 145 (2009) (allowing indemnification of directors, officers, and others,
but not if they act in bad faith).
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which Delaware courts have analyzed directors’ fiduciary duties to
shareholders. The Moran v. Household International, Inc., decision
announced that Delaware Law would not countenance “subversion of
corporate democracy by manipulation of corporate machinery.”222 In
both Aprahamian and Blasius, the court declined to apply the business
judgment rule where purposeful board action impaired shareholders’
voting rights.223 In In re Topps Co. Shareholder Litigation, the court
invalidated board actions that biased the voting process.224 In Hubbard v.
Hollywood Park Realty Enterprises, the court did not allow a board to take
passive advantage of a bylaw that operated inequitably against insurgent
shareholders.225 In In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation and in
Stone v. Ritter, the courts stated that deliberate indifference and inaction
in the face of a duty to act can constitute bad faith, removing protection
of the business judgment rule.226 Finally, in Mercier v. Inter-Tel the court
held that postponing an election to allow shareholders to consider new
information and the board’s advice was consistent with fiduciary duties
so long as it did not impede or coerce the shareholders’ vote.227
Implementing the Effective Voting Rule would create an incentive
for directors to contract with Broadridge (or other providers) for
verifiably fair and accurate proxy-handling and tabulation services.
Even without difficult-to-measure damages, an increased risk of having
to repeat the expensive proxy and election process would encourage
accuracy; and courts could require directors who fail in their duty to
assure a fair and accurate vote count to bear the cost of a new election, as
the court did in Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell International, Inc.228 Under such
pressure the securities industry undoubtedly would implement hitherto
neglected technical and procedural improvements. And if Delaware
implements the rule, its direct jurisdiction and indirect influence
practically ensure that fair and accurate proxy voting will become the
industry standard.
490 A.2d 1059, 1080 (Del. Ch. 1985); see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206–07 (Del. Ch. 1987); Blasius Indus., Inc.
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). See supra Section II.C.4 on anti-takeover
defenses.
224
926 A.2d 58, 84–93 (Del. Ch. 2007). See supra Section II.A.
225
Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enterprises, No. Civ A. 11779, 1991 WL3151 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 14, 1991).
226
907 A.2d 693, 754–55 (Del. Ch. 2005); 911 A.2d 362, 369, 372 (Del. 2006). See supra note
76 and accompanying text; section II.C.5 on the duty of good faith.
227
929 A.2d at 813.
228
Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding incumbent
board’s secret vote-buying arrangement and manipulative conduct of annual meeting were
inequitable conduct, the court set aside corporate election and ordered new election with
expense to be borne by defendant incumbents).
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As a corollary matter, the Effective Voting Rule may require
narrowing the application of section 141(e) of the General Corporation
Law, which protects directors from liability when they rely on reports or
information from persons they reasonably believe to have expert or
professional competence.229 Although such protection is appropriate
when directors make business decisions, a board should not escape
accountability for ministerial acts merely by relying on outside service
providers to administer portions of the election process.
A second corollary matter is the current unenforceability of the
proxyholder’s duty, as agent for the beneficial owner, to vote according
to instructions. Current law affords no remedy for such failure,
regardless of the reason, treating it as a voluntarily incurred risk.
Because street-name shareholding is the predominant practice, courts
should acknowledge that most beneficial owners must vote their shares
through proxies. Given this factual reality, courts should enforce
proxyholders’ duty under agency law to vote according to the beneficial
owner’s instructions, reversing the voluntary-assumption-of-risk
precedents. As with directors under the Effective Voting Rule, if
proxyholders faced potential liability, the securities industry would
promptly hold Broadridge accountable to provide verifiable and
auditable proxy voting—or a competing service provider would emerge
to satisfy the need.230
V. CONCLUSION
Until recent years close corporate elections were rare; voting usually
was so lopsided that any errors in the count were of no consequence.
But since the 1980s, defensive responses to hostile takeovers and
shareholder activism have generated frequent proxy contests, often with
close decisions. Boards are interested parties in proxy contests, and they
are able to influence the vote through scheduling of elections, control of
the annual meeting’s agenda and chair, and other measures that
disadvantage an opposing faction.
Intentional miscounting of proxy votes (or ballot box stuffing) by a
board, if proven, would not be a reasonable or proportionate defensive
measure under Unocal/Unitrin doctrine, and would not find a compelling
justification under Blasius. However, despite the statutory allocation to
See supra note 61.
Because it is conducted through extensive use of mail and electronic communications,
the proxy process obviously is within the purview of federal mail fraud and wire fraud
statutes. In an extreme case it is conceivable that facts could arise that would support
racketeering charges against directors or parties handling proxies on an “honest services”
theory—as has occurred in the case of tampering with union elections. See supra note 43.
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shareholders of governance power that legitimates a board’s powers,
Delaware courts have tolerated a system of voting that allows the
outcome of corporate elections to be determined by means other than a
fair and accurate count of shareholders’ votes. First, the complex proxy
system gives an advantage to incumbent boards and their proposals.
Second, proxy tabulation is prone to errors—through which
shareholders’ votes may be rejected or even cast against their express
instructions. Neither boards, nor their attorneys, nor the courts can
credibly claim ignorance of the problems.
Troubling questions arise. How can a board claim legitimacy for its
continuing control of the corporation, or for ratification of a transaction
that requires shareholders’ approval, if it has good reason to suspect
serious flaws in the procedures by which it obtains shareholders’
statutorily required approval? Do boards have an affirmative fiduciary
duty to conduct fair elections, and is that duty breached when a board
passively allows biased voting procedures to work in its favor? If so,
should a board be able to escape its responsibility for conducting fair
elections merely by the expedient of engaging outside providers for
proxy communication and tabulation services?
This Note assumes that the expectation of accurate counting is
fundamental to any kind of democratic election, and that the legitimacy
of corporate elections is important to sustain trust in the public
corporations that dominate economic life. Where the law grants
shareholders a vote, assuring an accurate vote count is obligatory.
Because boards conduct corporate elections even though they are
interested in the outcome, the law should obligate them to use
demonstrably fair and accurate election procedures.
The proposed Effective Voting Rule would impose an affirmative
duty on boards to assure fair and accurate elections. When a board’s role
is to provide the mechanism for shareholders to exercise their statutory
rights, rather than to exercise its own business discretion, the business
judgment rule should not apply. The Effective Voting Rule proposed
here builds on Delaware precedents but strengthens the interpretation of
directors’ fiduciary duties in the special context of facilitating a decision
that the law allocates to shareholders. By doing so, it might strengthen
the real and perceived legitimacy of corporate enterprises.
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